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CONSERVATIVE COLLISION COURSE?:
THE TENSION BETWEEN CONSERVATIVE
CORPORATE LAW THEORY
AND CITIZENS UNITED
Leo E. Strine, Jr.† & Nicholas Walter ††
One important aspect of Citizens United has been overlooked: the
tension between the conservative majority’s view of for-profit corporations
and the theory of for-profit corporations embraced by conservative thinkers.
This Article explores the tension between these conservative schools of thought
and shows that Citizens United may unwittingly strengthen the arguments
of conservative corporate theory’s principal rival.
Citizens United posits that stockholders of for-profit corporations can
constrain corporate political spending and that corporations can legitimately
engage in political spending.  Conservative corporate theory is premised on
the contrary assumptions that stockholders are poorly positioned to monitor
corporate managers for even their fidelity to a profit-maximization principle,
and that corporate managers have no legitimate ability to reconcile stockhold-
ers’ diverse political views.  Because stockholders invest in for-profit corpora-
tions for financial gain, and not to express political or moral values,
conservative corporate theory argues that corporate managers should focus
solely on stockholder wealth maximization and non-stockholder constituen-
cies and society should rely upon government regulation to protect against
corporate overreaching.  Conservative corporate theory’s recognition that cor-
porations lack legitimacy in this area has been strengthened by market devel-
opments that Citizens United slighted: that most humans invest in the
equity markets through mutual funds under 401(k) plans, cannot exit these
investments as a practical matter, and lack any rational ability to influence
how corporations spend in the political process.
Because Citizens United unleashes corporate wealth to influence who
gets elected to regulate corporate conduct and because conservative corporate
theory holds that such spending may only be motivated by a desire to increase
corporate profits, the result is that corporations are likely to engage in politi-
cal spending solely to elect or defeat candidates who favor industry-friendly
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regulatory policies, even though human investors have far broader concerns,
including a desire to be protected from externalities generated by corporate
profit seeking. Citizens United thus undercuts conservative corporate
theory’s reliance upon regulation as an answer to corporate externality risk,
and strengthens the argument of its rival theory that corporate managers
must consider the best interests of employees, consumers, communities, the
environment, and society—and not just stockholders—when making busi-
ness decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC1
there has been vigorous debate about the wisdom of that decision,
both as a matter of constitutional interpretation and public policy.
Citizens United has been characterized as a “conservative” decision, in
the sense that it was the product of the five more conservative judges
on the Court.2  But critics have argued that although the judicial ma-
jority in the case come from the political right, the decision is difficult
to reconcile with certain traditional conservative constitutional princi-
ples,3 which include judicial restraint and reluctance to override deci-
sions made by the political branches.4
In this Article, however, we address a less contestable but none-
theless important implication of that decision, which is that to the ex-
tent that Citizens United is viewed as a conservative ruling, it is one that
is in tension with another school of conservative thought that has a
longer tradition.  That school of conservative thought addresses for-
profit corporations specifically and the proper end of their
governance.
As an initial matter, it is critical to make a point about our use of
the term “conservative.”  In reference to corporate law, we refer to the
1 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword: Conservative
Judicial Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 865–66 (2011) (criticizing Citizens United as an
example of “conservative judicial activism” and noting that the Court split along ideologi-
cal lines); Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL.
L. REV. 485, 487 (same).
3 See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Citizens United as Corporate Law Narrative, 16 NEXUS: CHAP.
J.L. & POL’Y 39, 40–45 (2011) (arguing that Citizens United could have been decided on
narrower grounds and thus deviated from principles of judicial restraint); Jeffrey Rosen,
Originalism, Precedent, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 133–35 (2011)
(stating that Citizens United ignored precedent); Stone, supra note 2, at 496–97 (“[U]nder R
an approach embracing judicial restraint and deference to the elected branches of govern-
ment, the Court would have had to uphold the [statutory provisions] challenged [in Citi-
zens United].”).
4 E.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing the majority opinion as a “jaw-dropping . . . assertion of judicial supremacy
over the people’s Representatives in Congress and the Executive”); FCC v. Beach
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993) (Thomas, J.) (“Where there are ‘plausible
reasons’ for Congress’ action, ‘our inquiry is at an end.’  This standard of review is a para-
digm of judicial restraint.  ‘The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer
antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic pro-
cess and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may
think a political branch has acted.’” (citations omitted)); PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d
786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“[T]he cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is
necessary not to decide more—counsels us to go no further.”); William P. Marshall, Absten-
tion, Separation of Powers, and Recasting the Meaning of Judicial Restraint, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
881, 897 (2013) (“Those who believed that the federal courts should be reluctant to inter-
fere with the actions of the political branches, when possible, were considered judicial
conservatives who favored judicial restraint.”).
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basic theory of the for-profit firm that is most associated with legal and
economic thinkers who are typically labeled as conservatives.  Conser-
vatism has a long lineage, and we do not attempt to argue that impor-
tant figures who adhere to what we describe as the conservative theory
of corporate law, such as Milton Friedman or Friedrich Hayek, are
conservative in any particular sense.5  Rather, we make a non-contro-
versial point, which is that the theory of the firm we describe as con-
servative corporate theory is that traditionally associated with thinkers
on the political right, and that the political right embraces the term
“conservative” as its own moniker.  Likewise, when we describe the
Citizens United majority as conservative, we do so based on our under-
standing that each of the Justices comprising the majority is com-
monly described in such terms and has a political background
consistent with that ascription.  We do not enter any argument about
whether the majority’s individual approaches to jurisprudence would
qualify as conservative in some normative sense.  Rather, we simply
observe the reality that the Citizens United majority was comprised of
Justices who are associated with the political right and regarded as
conservative in the colloquial sense.
In Part I, we discuss this modern conservative notion of the cor-
poration.  Under the conservative view embraced by conservative
icons like Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Frank Easterbrook,
for-profit corporations should be governed with one end in mind: the
generation of the most profit for their stockholders.  Because stock-
holders entrust their capital to for-profit corporations to make money
and not as an expression of their moral values, conservative corporate
law regards a board of directors as having no legitimate right to use
the corporation’s funds to pursue their idiosyncratic vision of the so-
cial good.  Moreover, because it is difficult, and often irrational, for
stockholders to use their rights to hold corporate managers accounta-
ble even for the limited goal of profit creation, conservative corporate
theory worries that allowing managers to justify their actions by refer-
ence to diverse ends will result in them being effectively unaccounta-
ble for achieving any of them.  For these reasons, conservative
corporate theory argues that corporate managers must have only one
end in mind when they make decisions: profit.  This does not mean
that other interests cannot be considered, but it does mean that those
interests can only be considered instrumentally in terms of their utility
to producing the most profit for stockholders.
Conservative corporate theory is not blind to the argument that a
corporate focus on profit maximization as the sole goal will result in
5 For example, we are not concerned about whether any of them would be described
as a Burkean conservative, as opposed to a libertarian conservative, a social conservative, or
any other kind of conservative.
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callous behavior.  But conservative corporate theorists note that, in
many situations, paying employees more or being a responsible “cor-
porate citizen” by supporting charitable institutions in communities
where the corporation operates are sound instruments to producing
the most profits over the long term.  Even more important, conserva-
tive corporate theorists note that other constituencies affected by cor-
porate behavior—workers, neighbors, customers, communities, and
those affected by the corporation’s impact on the environment—are
protected by societal regulation.  Conservative corporate theory ac-
knowledges that corporations have a rational incentive to try to exter-
nalize the costs of their conduct to society (e.g., by taking
environmental shortcuts), while internalizing the resulting excess
profits reaped from those shortcuts.  The answer of conservative cor-
porate theory is that the duty of corporate managers to pursue profit
is checked by their duty to do so within the “rules of the game”—the
laws and regulations enacted by legislators, who represent not corpo-
rations but society as a whole.
Conservative corporate theory’s major historical rival is a view
that regards the for-profit corporation as a distinct legal entity formed
by statutory authorization of the chartering government and granted
special legal privileges.  Because the for-profit corporation is a legal
entity distinct from its stockholders or any other particular corporate
constituency, the board is entitled (and, in stronger forms of this rival
theory, required) to govern the corporation in a manner that consid-
ers the best interests of all constituencies affected by the corporation’s
conduct, including its workers, its customers, the communities in
which it operates, and society generally.  Because all these constituen-
cies are important to corporate success, the managers may give these
interests weight as ends, not just as a means to stockholder wealth
maximization.
This rival to the conservative theory of the corporation has long
argued that external regulation is an insufficient protection for society
and corporate constituencies such as employees and consumers.  Its
proponents argue that these interests must be given priority within
corporate law itself, and that corporate law should empower corporate
managers to conduct the affairs of the corporation in a manner that
gives weight to the best interests of the corporation’s employees, con-
sumers, the communities it affects, and society as a whole.  For-profit
corporations, in this view, are too powerful and have been accorded
too many rights similar to those given to actual humans for them not
to behave in a socially responsible manner that reflects the full range
of concerns that actual humans consider important—concerns that go
beyond a desire for lucre.
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In Part II, we discuss the Citizens United decision and the McCain-
Feingold Act, which Citizens United invalidated in part.  Under Citizens
United, corporations have the constitutional right to spend unlimited
amounts of corporate funds to influence the outcome of elections by
expressly advocating the election or defeat of particular political can-
didates.  This right is not dependent on the corporation securing
from its individual stockholders their specific assent to having corpo-
rate funds used in this manner.  Rather, the corporation itself has a
constitutional right to speak in this manner as a distinct “person,” and
its managers are the ones who, under traditional principles of corpo-
rate law, make spending decisions.
In Part III, we illustrate how certain assumptions of Citizens United
about corporations and their investors are inconsistent with conserva-
tive corporate theory. Citizens United rests on the notion that stock-
holders in corporations are well positioned to exercise influence over
corporate political-spending decisions and that corporate political
spending will therefore be a legitimate reflection of stockholder senti-
ment.  But conservative corporate law theory is founded in important
part on the premise that stockholders are poorly positioned to moni-
tor corporate managers even for their fidelity to a profit-maximization
goal.  Indeed, conservative corporate law theory teaches that it is often
irrational for stockholders to exercise voice over even profit-related
issues, much less to influence a particular corporation’s approach to
political spending.  Conservative corporate law theory has long been
concerned that corporate managers lack legitimacy to act for any end
other than profit, because stockholders of for-profit corporations typi-
cally invest solely for profit, have diverse political and moral views that
corporate managers have no legitimacy or effective capacity to recon-
cile, and cannot be fairly said to have authorized corporate managers
to use corporate funds to speak on their behalf as to debatable issues
of social policy.
Part IV enriches this discussion by introducing a reality that the
Citizens United decision seemed to elide, which is that most of the stock
of the wealthiest corporations in our society is not owned directly by
human beings.  Because of the “separation of ownership from owner-
ship,”6 most corporate stock is owned by intermediate institutions—
which are often business entities themselves—on behalf of the human
beings whose money is ultimately at stake.  Increasingly, Americans
are required as a practical matter to save for retirement by putting
aside much of their wealth in eligible investments under their em-
ployer’s tax-advantaged 401(k) plan.  Typically, such plans give the in-
6 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?  Reflections on the Shared
Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L.
1, 6 (2007).
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vestors a choice of funds from a few mutual fund companies and do
not allow investors to pick and choose individual stocks.  This wealth is
effectively impounded in mutual funds until the individual investors
reach retirement age.  If Americans attempt to take this wealth out
before then, they face expropriation of a majority of the proceeds,
and if they don’t take advantage of § 401(k), they will likely not be
able to fund a secure retirement, owing to the decline in defined-
benefit plans and the difficulty of funding a retirement with invest-
ments of post-tax income dollars.
As a result, end-user human investors are in fact more distant
than ever from the public corporations that have their capital.  To
have a say over whether their dollars are being used by Exxon Mobil,
Apple, Starbucks, etc., to support the election of candidates they do
not support, end-user investors have to fight through two layers of
agency by, first, causing their mutual fund to take action, and then
having that mutual fund rally support from other stockholders to con-
strain the corporation’s conduct. Citizens United took little account of
this reality, which is becoming more and more the model of stock
ownership.7  As it is, institutional investors already employ proxy advi-
sory firms to help them deal with an ever-growing number of votes
each year.  The idea that a mutual fund that invests on a broad in-
dexed basis or funds like the Vanguard Dividend Growth Fund will be
legitimately positioned to provide effective oversight over corporate
political spending or find it rational to try is strained.  Indeed, promi-
nent mutual fund complexes like Vanguard and Fidelity do not see it
as their job to even vote on social proposals put forward by stockhold-
ers and thus typically abstain.  Moreover, conservative corporate the-
ory would regard the use of investor resources for this purpose to be
wasteful and detrimental to the core purpose of sound wealth
creation.
Interestingly, conservative jurists in the past have found it a viola-
tion of First Amendment rights for the government to put human
Americans in a situation where their wealth is required to be given to
others who might, without their choice, use it to make political ex-
penditures.8  As will be explained, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
7 The dissent spotted it, by contrast.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 477
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Most American house-
holds that own stock do so through intermediaries such as mutual funds and pension
plans, which makes it more difficult both to monitor and to alter particular holdings.”
(citation omitted)).
8 In a recent article, Professor Fisk and Dean Chemerinsky traced the path of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on associational speech and highlighted the Court’s incon-
sistent treatment of corporations and unions, on which we focus in the latter part of this
Article. See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights
After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1052 (2013).
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the Supreme Court, speaking through Republican Justice Potter
Stewart, held that union employees could not be required to pay
union dues that would be used for ideological purposes that were un-
related to the collective bargaining process.9  Under this reasoning,
there is an argument that the structure of federal retirement incen-
tives set up by § 401(k) of the tax code is unconstitutional, because it,
as a matter of effective mandate, forces Americans to turn over their
wealth to institutions that are permitted to use it for expressive pur-
poses that they do not support. Abood arguably calls for an end to any
political spending by corporations that accept investments from mu-
tual funds unless that spending is authorized not just by the funds, but
through pass-through voting by individual end-user investors.  As a
practical matter, the reality is that it is now easier to find employment
with a nonunion employer than to avoid having most of one’s savings
entrusted to mutual funds and through them, to the stock market, for
generations.  There is no escaping from § 401(k) without paying ex-
propriatory levels of taxation or underfunding one’s retirement.  And
it is difficult to save for children’s college educations without facing
the same problem.
In Part V, we identify the most fundamental problem that Citizens
United poses for conservative corporate theory: it undermines con-
servative corporate theory’s reliance upon the regulatory process as an
adequate safeguard against corporate overreaching for non-stock-
holder constituencies and society generally.  But that reliance on soci-
etal regulation as an answer to externality risk grew up against a
backdrop where it was recognized that corporations were appropri-
ately limited in their conduct by the governments that granted them
the important concessions that come with the corporate form.  After
Citizens United, the very success of the corporate form as a wealth-
generating tool is in tension with conservative corporate theory be-
cause if the wealth impounded in corporations can be used in unlim-
ited amounts to influence who is elected to the offices that determine
the “rules of the game,” the range of policy options is likely to move in
a direction where there is greater danger of externality risk.  Because,
under conservative corporate theory, corporate managers can only
make political expenditures as an instrument toward the end of profit
maximization, those expenditures are likely to be made in aid of elect-
ing candidates solely for the reason that these candidates would em-
brace the regulatory policies that the corporation finds most
favorable.  Conservative economic thought would accept the mun-
dane notion that corporations seeking to maximize returns solely to
stockholders, which stand to gain more for their stockholders if they
9 431 U.S. 209, 241–42 (1977).
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can externalize costs, will tend to support a reduction in regulation
designed to minimize externality risk to society and designed to pro-
tect constituencies other than stockholders.  After all, conservative
corporate law theory is grounded precisely on the reality that for-
profit corporations are distinctly different from the flesh-and-blood
humans whose equity capital they ultimate control.  These flesh-and-
blood humans often have diverse concerns—relatives with medical
conditions, a love for the environment, beliefs about helping the
poor, views about social issues like abortion or national security—that
lead them to vote for political candidates for reasons other than the
prospect that the candidate will vote for the policies most likely to
increase their household wealth.  Conservative corporate law theory
posits that corporate managers are not elected by stockholders to act
on values like these—especially because stockholders are likely to
have diverse and irreconcilable thoughts on these subjects—but to
embrace a singular goal that all stockholders presumably agree upon,
which is that the corporation should increase its profits for their bene-
fit.  These stockholders can then use the resulting wealth as they wish
to express their own values in a legitimate, direct way.
Citizens United puts great stress on this model.  If corporate man-
agers follow conservative corporate theory, they will tend to make po-
litical expenditures to elect candidates supportive of lax regulation.
Precisely because actual human investors are also consumers, employ-
ees, and breathers of the air, this singular focus is inconsistent with
the full range of values that would influence their own electoral pref-
erences.  And if corporate managers respond to this concern by at-
tempting to make political expenditures that somehow take into
account the full range of concerns held by diverse human voters, they
will be acting in a manner that conservative corporate theory has long
seen as illegitimate.
Part VI addresses the extent to which the bipartisan McCain-
Feingold bill and pre–Citizens United precedent, while having the im-
perfections inherent in any human product, took into account the
realities of the actual corporate governance system we have in a man-
ner that did not place stress on conservative corporate theory.  In
prior decisions, the Supreme Court had adroitly protected the ability
of individuals to use nonprofit corporations as an aggregating tool for
effective speech on their collective behalf, and had restricted statutory
limitations on corporate political spending largely to for-profit corpo-
rations.10  And under McCain-Feingold and prior statutory law, even
10 See FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 481 (2007) (holding that § 203(b)
of the McCain-Feingold Act, which makes it a crime for a corporation to broadcast, shortly
before an election, a communication naming a federal candidate and targeted to the elec-
torate, was unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit, nonstock corporation organized for
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for-profit corporations were not inhibited from using corporate funds
to employ lobbyists to advance the corporation’s views.11  Nor were
for-profit corporations barred entirely from influencing the election
process directly.  McCain-Feingold left corporations able to form polit-
ical action committees (PACs) by raising funds through voluntary con-
tributions from their stockholders and employees.12  These PACs
could make both direct contributions to political candidates within
statutory limits and engage in unlimited spending to make election-
eering communications.13  But these expenditures could not come
from the corporate treasury itself, but only from the resources raised
by the PAC from contributors fully on notice that the PAC would en-
gage in expenditures of those kinds.  Thus, McCain-Feingold fit nicely
with conservative corporate law theory regarding for-profit firms.  By
preventing unlimited use of the corporate treasury to directly influ-
ence the election process, McCain-Feingold addressed in a propor-
tionate manner the concern that managers solely charged with
focusing on profit would have too much ability to use corporate
wealth to unfairly tilt the regulatory policymaking process in a manner
that would be unfair to other corporate constituencies and society as a
whole.  By providing a means for corporations to raise funds in a vol-
untary manner through PACs, McCain-Feingold enabled corporations
to rally the expressive concerns of those stockholders who specifically
desired that their funds be used in that way, while respecting the tradi-
tional conservative corporate theory view that it is illegitimate for cor-
porate managers to use the entrusted equity of diverse stockholders
for their idiosyncratic views of the common good.  Notably, these
means reflected the values undergirding the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Abood and its related cases of regarding respect for the expres-
sive rights of workers who did not want their wealth used by their
advocacy purposes); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which prohibited
corporations from making independent expenditures out of their treasuries in support of,
or in opposition to, a candidate in an election for state office, and ruling that the act could
be applied to a nonprofit corporation that served as a mouthpiece for for-profit corpora-
tions); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986) (explaining that
§ 441b of the Federal Election Campaign Act, which prohibited corporations from making
expenditures out of their treasuries “in connection with” a federal election, could not be
applied to a nonprofit, nonstock corporation organized for advocacy purposes, because
the “concern that organizations that amass great wealth in the economic marketplace not
gain unfair advantage in the political marketplace” did not apply to them).
11 See generally Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 200–08 (2012) (describing federal and state lobbying regulations).
12 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006) (defining “contribution” to exclude contributions to
“separate segregated fund[s]” established by corporations, i.e., PACs); see also 11 C.F.R.
§ 114.2 (2009) (setting out regulations for contributions by corporations, and by and to
their PACs).
13 See 11 C.F.R. § 114.2.
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union for political purposes.  As a matter of economic reality, moreo-
ver, McCain-Feingold did not leave corporations outgunned by other
societal interests.  Precisely because the corporate form is such a pow-
erful tool for wealth creation and impounds much of the wealth of
individuals, for-profit corporations hold and control far more wealth
than individuals and the representatives of other corporate constitu-
encies.  Even before Citizens United, this reality meant that corporate
interests spent far more on lobbying and political activity than labor
unions, environmental groups, and others.
Part VII concludes by noting that Citizens United further im-
balanced this dynamic by allowing for the unlimited use of the for-
profit corporate treasury to influence the electoral process directly.
As a result, Citizens United can be rationally understood as buttressing
conservative corporate law theory’s primary rival.14  Under that very
different rival theory, corporate managers not only may, but are re-
quired to, consider the best interests of all those affected by the corpo-
ration’s conduct when exercising their power.  As those of this school
argue, by making clear that the for-profit corporation is a citizen like
any other, Citizens United logically supports the proposition that a cor-
poration’s governing board must be free to think like any other citi-
zen and put a value on things like the quality of the environment, the
elimination of poverty, the alleviation of suffering among the ill, and
other values that animate actual human beings.  Otherwise, a creation
of human legislators—the for-profit corporation—may become a
ruthless Leviathan that is a danger to the society that gave it life.15
Having failed to address the practical differences between human be-
ings and corporations and invested for-profit corporations with full
human rights, Citizens United has, these rival corporate theorists would
say, made plain that making profit the sole end of corporate govern-
ance is an irresponsible and pernicious public policy.  Otherwise, they
14 The more recent case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014),
bears out this understanding.  There, the same conservative five-Justice majority that de-
cided Citizens United held explicitly that profit is not the sole end of corporate governance:
Some lower court judges have suggested that . . . the purpose of [for-profit]
corporations is simply to make money.  This argument flies in the face of
modern corporate law.  Each American jurisdiction today either expressly
or by implication authorizes corporations to be formed under its general
corporation act for any lawful purpose or business.  While it is certainly true
that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern
corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at
the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.
Id. at 2770–71 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
As we discuss in Part I below, conservative corporate legal theory rejects this view.  The
Hobby Lobby case thus confirms that the view of corporate law held by the five Justices mak-
ing up the Citizens United majority is at odds with traditional conservative thought.
15 The term Leviathan is apt.  Theodore Levitt, a conservative, also described the cor-
poration that spends stockholders’ money on social responsibility as a “leviathan.”
Theodore Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsibility, 36 HARV. BUS. REV. 41 (1958).
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would contend, the values that the end-user investors whose capital is
ultimately at stake may be compromised by corporate managers using
their wealth in the blinkered, soulless manner of the pre-reform
Scrooge.
I
CONSERVATIVE CORPORATE LAW THEORY
A. The Stockholder Wealth Maximization Norm
It is hardly adventurous to assert that the predominant conserva-
tive theory of the for-profit corporation is one that embraces the view
that the managers of for-profit corporations must govern the corpora-
tion with only one end in mind: the best interests of their stockhold-
ers.  Prominent conservatives who have embraced this view include
Friedrich Hayek,16 Milton Friedman,17 Kenneth Arrow,18 Frank
Easterbrook,19 and Richard Posner,20 and also include many other
respected conservative economists and corporate law scholars, includ-
16 3 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEO-
PLE 82 (1979).  Hayek feared that management would become accountable to the
government:
So long as the management has the one overriding duty of administering
the resources under its control as trustees for the shareholders and for their
benefit, its hands are largely tied; and it will have no arbitrary power to
benefit this or that particular interest.  But once the management of a big
enterprise is regarded as not only entitled but even obliged to consider in
its decisions whatever is regarded as the public or social interest, or to sup-
port good causes and generally to act for the public benefit, it gains indeed
an uncontrollable power—a power which could not long be left in the
hands of private managers but would inevitably be made the subject of in-
creasing public control.
Id.
17 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133–36 (2002) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM]; Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33 [hereinafter Friedman, Social Responsibility].
18 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL’Y 303
(1973), reprinted in 6 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: APPLIED ECONOMICS 130 (2d
ed., 1985).  Arrow writes that “[u]nder the proper assumptions profit maximization is in-
deed efficient in the sense that it can achieve as high a level of satisfaction as possible for
any one consumer without reducing the levels of satisfaction of other consumers or using
more resources than society is endowed with.” Id. at 132.  These include that the profit-
maximizing firms are not natural monopolies, that corporations pay for all the costs they
cause, and that consumers are informed about the safety of corporations’ products.
19 E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15–22 (1991) (arguing that stockholders have implicitly contracted for a
promise that the firm will maximize its profits in the long run).
20 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 572–73 (8th ed. 2011).
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ing Henry Manne,21 Michael Jensen,22 Henry Butler,23 and Stephen
Bainbridge.24
For many reasons, conservative corporate law theory believes it is
socially and morally optimal that corporate managers make decisions
solely based on what will produce the most profits for stockholders.25
Under this theory, that does not mean that corporate managers can-
not think long-term and must pursue the action that will generate the
most short-term profit, if that would impair the corporation’s ultimate
ability to generate the highest returns for stockholders.26  Under this
theory, that does not mean that corporate managers cannot consider
other constituencies and interests affected by the corporation’s con-
duct—such as employees, customers, communities in which it oper-
ates, and society generally—but it does mean that they can only do so
when that is instrumental to profit generation.27  Put simply, conserva-
tive corporate theory embraces the notion that seeking profit for the
stockholders is the only proper end.
The historical rival for this viewpoint has been that corporations
are artificial entities authorized by government itself and granted spe-
cial privileges, and not because the government viewed them solely as
21 HENRY G. MANNE & HENRY C. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 10–20 (1972).
22 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, 7 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 297, 302 (2001).
23 E.g., Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder
Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1195, 1223–24 (1999) (stating that stockholders have a “contractual expectation” to
the residual cash flows from a corporation, and managers who engage in philanthropy not
motivated by profits “are giving away the shareholders’ money”).
24 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 410 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION] (“[L]ong-run shareholder wealth maximization is the only
proper end of corporate governance.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means
and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 574 (2003) [hereinafter Bain-
bridge, Director Primacy] (arguing that the “director primacy” means of corporate govern-
ance encompasses the stockholder wealth maximization end as a norm); see also ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (observing that the “traditional” view of cor-
porate governance is one by which corporations will attempt to maximize stockholder prof-
its); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 38–40 (2003)
(observing that stockholder wealth maximization is the end American corporate law typi-
cally accepts); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 185 (“[M]anagers have an
overarching duty to maximize their firm’s value for shareholders.”); Roberta Romano, The
Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113 (1987) (stating that the core
goal of corporate law is maximizing equity share prices).
25 See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 261, 265 (1992) (“The corporation’s purpose is to advance the purposes of
these [stockholder-owners], and the function of directors, as agents of the owners, is faith-
fully to advance the financial interests of the owners.”).
26 Id. at 272–73.
27 Id.
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a method to advance the interests of their investors.28  Rather, state
governments authorized corporations to have a distinct legal identity
from their stockholders and any particular constituency, and corpora-
tions were chartered to facilitate diverse social goals.29  In this view,
the for-profit corporation is seen as “an economic institution which
has a social service as well as a profit-making function.”30  Although
the law may give stockholders certain rights not given to other constit-
uencies, corporate directors while in office may exercise their disinter-
ested discretion (in the narrow sense of not financially lining their
own pockets) in a manner that does not put stockholders above other
corporate constituencies, but that considers the best interests of those
constituencies as a proper end of corporate governance.31  Unless this
is the case, corporations, adherents to this theory argue, will pose an
excess externality risk to society because their singular focus on profits
will be likely to induce them to take shortcuts that could result in
harm to others through product defects, environmental spoilage, and
firm failures, which hurt not only stockholders, but employees, credi-
tors, and all who breathe the air and pay taxes.32
Furthermore, this theory argues that even stockholders are likely
to make more profits if the interests of other corporate constituencies
important to value creation, such as employees, creditors, suppliers,
customers, and even government33 are respected, because that will en-
courage those constituencies to make firm-specific investments that
raise firm value and thus aid stockholders, too.  In stronger concep-
28 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985) (“[T]he business corporation was regarded as an ‘ar-
tific[i]al being’ created by the state . . . .”); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201, 205–12 (describing theories of the corporation in American legal history).
29 Horwitz, supra note 28, at 181; Millon, supra note 28, at 207. R
30 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1148 (1932). See generally Allen, supra note 25, at 265 (discussing this long-standing R
conception of for-profit corporate governance, which emphasizes the broader social pur-
poses served by corporations).
31 See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 744 (2005) (describing cases where “managers are sacrificing corporate profits in a
way that confers a general benefit on others”).
32 See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 127–30 (2006) (assert-
ing that corporations should serve “society as a whole”); Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two
Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631,
655 (2009) (“[E]ven if a corporation’s purpose is not to pursue the maximization of aggre-
gate social welfare, it should refrain from actions that negatively impact social welfare.”);
Elhauge, supra note 31, at 738–39 (arguing that law cannot optimally regulate corporate R
conduct, and managers need discretion to act in the public interest to correct this
deficiency).
33 Government often provides important subsidies to the private sector, through tax
breaks, direct capital investments in supportive infrastructure, technology sharing, and
market opening. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Pri-
macy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1197–98 (2002) (noting that governments frequently support
businesses through tax breaks and financing).
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tions, corporate managers may not only do this but are seen as owing
just as great a duty of loyalty to all corporate constituencies as they do
to stockholders.34  Although we personally are loath to describe cor-
porate law theories in ideological terms that translate directly into
where adherents lie on the political spectrum, it is fair to say that the
strongest form of this rival theory to conservative corporate theory—
the so-called social responsibility movement—is embraced more by
scholars of the political left.35  Moreover, as the current debate stands,
even the weaker form of this rival theory—which simply argues that
corporate managers have discretion to balance the interests of corpo-
rate constituencies—has more currency among thinkers whose every-
day politics seem more left-of-center.36
A torrent of prose is still being generated by these contesting
schools of thought.37  For present purposes, though, a mundane pro-
34 See, e.g., id. at 1196–97 (noting that nonshareholders rely on implicit contracts with
corporate managers).
35 See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 116–35 (4th ed.
1985) (arguing against the profit-maximization norm); GREENFIELD, supra note 32; MANNE R
& WALLICH, supra note 21, at 37, 71 (citing the views of Henry Wallich that because “corpo- R
rations are creatures of the state, originally created by act of the sovereign[,]” corporations
have responsibilities to society); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 321 (1999) (discussing progressives’ preference
for a stakeholder approach); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993) (“[T]ruly relentless pursuit of
shareholder wealth maximization is inconsistent with actual business practice and socially
unacceptable in any event.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance,
45 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1268 (1992) (arguing that corporate law is responsible for the
“short-term focus of American corporations” and proposing reforms to address short-term-
ism); Ralph Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 90
(Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green eds., 1973) (describing corporate accountability as a bur-
den corporations must bear to show “they are acting in the public interest”) (emphasis
omitted); Wendy E. Wagner, Imagining Corporate Sustainability as a Public Good Rather Than a
Corporate Bad, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561, 567–70 (2011) (discussing corporate responsi-
bility in the context of environmental sustainability); Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper In-
terpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 163, 171 (1991) (arguing for the “best interests of the corporation” standard over the
“shareholder only” standard in defining the duties of a corporation’s directors).
36 Blair & Stout, supra note 35, at 304; Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s R
Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 118–24 (1979); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practi-
cal Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 629–30 (1992).
37 See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND
HOW TO RESTORE FAITH IN IT 11 (2013) (discussing the need for ethical, economically
driven corporations “without relying on regulators or the state”); LYNN STOUT, THE SHARE-
HOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORA-
TIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 6 (2012) (arguing “that conventional shareholder primacy harms
not only stakeholders and the public, but most shareholders as well”); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) [hereinafter
Bebchuk, Shareholder Power]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA.
L. REV. 675, 676 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise] (arguing that the
shareholder franchise is not effective in ensuring that directorial power is legitimate);
Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733
(2007) (responding to Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise).
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position is all that is important, which is that the predominant con-
servative theory of the corporation is one that asserts that the sole
legitimate goal of the for-profit corporation is maximizing profits for
the benefit of stockholders.38
It is also important to highlight several of the key reasons why
conservative corporate theory contends that singular focus is optimal,
as a moral and practical matter, and as a matter of social welfare.  We
also underscore the stress that conservative corporate theory places on
the political process and resulting regulation of for-profit corpora-
tions as the safeguard that ensures that focusing corporate govern-
ance solely on profit maximization will not injure other corporate
constituencies or interests affected by corporate conduct.39
B. Conservative Corporate Theory Believes Corporate Managers
Have No Legitimate Right to Use Corporate Funds for
Ends Other than Stockholder Profit
Conservative corporate theorists view corporate managers as hav-
ing no legitimate right to use corporate funds for an end other than
38 Conservative corporate theory’s embrace of the idea that corporate directors must,
within their legal ability to do so, act for the end of generating profits is not universally
shared. The state where the most public corporations are incorporated, Delaware, does
embrace that idea, albeit in a form that gives managers broad discretion to determine the
means by which stockholder wealth is to be advanced.  Although some scholars disagree,
the case of Revlon as a practical matter settled the question in Delaware, by making clear
that other corporate constituencies may only be considered instrumentally in terms of
their relationship to creating profits for stockholders. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding that a board may consider
the interests of nonstockholder constituencies, but there must always be “rationally related
benefits accruing to the stockholders”).  Other decisions make this plain. E.g., N. Am.
Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007); In re
Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013); eBay Domestic Holdings,
Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also William T. Allen, Ambiguity in
Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 896–97 (1997) (“[T]he proper orientation of
corporation law is the protection of long-term value of capital committed indefinitely to
the firm.” (emphasis omitted)).
That said, a majority of American states have statutes permitting corporate boards to
consider constituencies and interests other than the stockholders as ends, not means. See
Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 85, 85 (1999).  None of these statutes allows other constituencies to have a
role in electing the board, and it is not clear that other constituencies have received
greater protection as a result of their enactment. See John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federaliza-
tion, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power,
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1112 (2011); Joseph William Singer, Jobs and Justice: Rethinking
the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 475, 503–05 (1993); Gary von Stange, Note, Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
461, 483 (1994).
39 See Arrow, supra note 18, at 310 (recognizing the reality of externalities and the R
need for regulation to address them if profit maximization is to be the efficient goal of
governance); Levitt, supra note 15, at 47. R
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ultimate stockholder profit.40  The reasons why are easy to understand
and have considerable historical and logical support.  For starters,
conservative corporate theory takes the practical view that stockhold-
ers invest in for-profit corporations not as an expression of their social
values or moral beliefs, but to make money.41  Had stockholders
wished to feed the poor, subsidize a hospital, or help a local art mu-
seum, they could have done so directly.  But they invested in a for-
profit widget, chip, software, tire, etc., company.  Can a rational infer-
ence be drawn that by making such an investment, the stockholders
were making a choice to have the board act as a United Way on their
behalf?  And if they wanted their money used that way by a disinter-
ested body, wouldn’t they have chosen the United Way, Salvation
Army, Catholic Charities, a foundation, or some other similar vehicle
to which to donate?
As conservative corporate theory notes, if the managers of a for-
profit corporation focus on profits, they will generate wealth for their
stockholders that those stockholders can determine how to use.  That
wealth can then be directly applied by the stockholders to causes they
choose for themselves.42  Because those causes will be chosen for
them, their money will not be used for purposes they do not em-
brace.43  This is an important moral and practical point for conserva-
tive corporate theory.  That theory recognizes that the only thing that
is common to all stockholders who hold a pure long position in the
corporation should be a desire to see the corporation increase its
profits and stock price.44  Even on that level, stockholders may have
40 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 20, at 573 (“[I]n competitive markets, a sustained com- R
mitment to any goal other than profitability will result in the firm’s shrinking, quite possi-
bly to nothing.”).
41 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 37; Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra R
note 17, at 5; Levitt, supra note 15, at 43. R
42 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 17, at 135. R
43 See POSNER, supra note 20, at 575. R
44 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 70 (“[W]hen voters hold dissimi- R
lar preferences it is not possible to aggregate their preferences into a consistent system of
choices. . . .  [S]ingle-objective firms are likely to prosper relative to others.  This suggests
. . . why the law makes no effort to require firms to adhere to any objective other than
profit maximization (as constrained by particular legal rules).”); POSNER, supra note 20, at R
556–57 (“The typical shareholder . . . has only a casual . . . relationship with the firm.  His
interest, like that of a creditor, is a financial rather than managerial interest.”); Butler &
McChesney, supra note 23, at 1224–25 (“[S]hareholders may have very different views on R
what is good for society.  Even if they do not, there is no reason to channel non-profit-
maximizing charity through the firm.  The firm has no advantage—in greater benefits or
lower costs—in making donations that profit-maximization does not justify.”); see also
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV.
995, 1004 (1998) (“Both the law and the market force corporate actors to run the corpora-
tion on behalf of the interests of fictional shareholders . . . .  Fictional shareholders, thus,
will sacrifice almost anything in the interests of higher profit . . . ; in contrast, the citizens
behind the fiction can be expected to have far more diverse and conflicted opinions on
these important political struggles.”).
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different investment horizons and objectives, but they do share a basic
objective in having firm value increase if that can be done in a sensi-
ble, durable way.45  But when the corporation begins to pursue as an
end other values, there is no rational reason to believe that the stock-
holders are of one mind on those issues, and much less that they in-
vested to have the board of directors choose one perspective on the
matter to pursue with the corporation’s funds.46
C. Conservative Corporate Theory Views the Realities of the
Stockholder-Manager Relationship as Supporting
Constraints on Managers to Focus Solely on
Stockholder Welfare as an End
Conservative corporate theory also grounds its focus on stock-
holder wealth maximization on the practical realities of the relation-
ship between managers and stockholders.47  Even before the
emergence of public corporations with widely diverse stockholder
bases, there was a concern that the legal rights granted to stockhold-
ers left them vulnerable to corporate managers.48  Because corporate
managers were on the job full time and had access to inside informa-
tion, they were in a comparatively stronger position.49  Moreover, mi-
nority stockholders who attempted to protect themselves by exercising
their legal rights would bear most of the costs of that use of legal
rights while sharing the benefits with other investors, and thus it was
more rational for them to be passive.50  When corporations began to
45 Levitt, supra note 15, at 44. R
46 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 32. R
47 See id. at 4–7.
48 See, e.g., Naomi Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the
Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression, in CORRUPTION AND
REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 125, 126–27 (Edward L. Glaeser &
Claudia Goldin eds., 2006).
49 See id. at 126–29 (“[T]he legal record from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries suggests that directors of corporations large and small frequently negotiated con-
tracts with other companies in which they had a financial interest, elected themselves to
corporate offices at lucrative salaries that they themselves set, arranged mergers that
earned themselves impressive capital gains while leaving other shareholders in the lurch,
and engaged in a wide variety of other actions from which they benefited at the expense of
their associates.” (footnotes omitted)).
50 Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99,
107 n.20 (1989) (“Shareholders are characterized as rationally ignorant because of the
large costs associated with staying informed about the corporation’s internal affairs and the
very small expected benefits to the individual shareholder of being informed.  After bear-
ing the costs of becoming informed, such shareholders are unlikely to be able to influence
the corporation’s policies and in any event they must share the benefits of intervention if
they are successful.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L. & ECON. 395, 420 (1983) (“Because of the easy availability of the exit option through
the stock market, the rational strategy for dissatisfied shareholders in most cases, given the
collective action problem, is to disinvest rather than incur costs in attempting to bring
about change through the voting process.”); see also Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Owner-
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grow larger and have diverse stockholder bases, Adolf Berle famously
focused on the growing separation between the ownership and con-
trol of corporations, with the stock being increasingly owned by di-
verse stockholders with small stakes and control being invested in
professional management.51  As a matter of pure corporate law, Berle
pointed out that the legal doctrines extant in the early twentieth cen-
tury gave stockholders relatively weak protections against managerial
misuse of its authority.52 He feared that allowing corporate managers
to justify their actions by reference to many possible ends—such as
the best interests of other corporate constituencies—rather than by
reference to whether their actions were in the best interests of stock-
holders, would leave them accountable to no one.53  He thus argued
that within the domain of fiduciary duty established by the equitable
common law of corporations, corporate managers should be expected
to focus solely on being faithful to the stockholders.54
Although Berle was a complex figure who was a political liberal
and influential New Dealer,55 this aspect of his thinking continues to
be a central component of conservative corporate theory.  Building
upon Berle’s rich description of the comparative strength and weak-
ness of managers and stockholders in the emerging economy that was
heavily reliant on public corporations as the major driver of societal
economic growth, conservative thinkers embraced the notion that cor-
porations would be dangerously unaccountable if the managers were
given broad discretion to pursue diverse ends.56  Although not una-
ship and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 390 (1983) (suggesting that shareholder
passivity is profit-maximizing); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 520, 526–28 (1990) (describing “[t]he modern, law-and-economics rendition of the
passivity story”).
51 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 91–118 (1991) (describing the separation between ownership and control in the
200 largest American corporations).
52 A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931).
53 A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1367 (1932).
54 Berle, supra note 52, at 1049. R
55 See JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN
ERA 81–91 (1987); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporat-
ist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008); Dalia Tsuk,
From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 182 (2005).
56 E.g., Butler & McChesney, supra note 23, at 1225 (“Corporate managers have R
enough trouble meeting the challenges of maximizing shareholder value without diverting
their attention to saving the world.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1191–92
(1981) (“A manager responsible to two conflicting interests is in fact answerable to
neither.”);  Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 32
(1991) (“[T]he primary beneficiaries of nonshareholder constituency statutes are incum-
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ware that the business judgment rule might give managers a license to
cloak decisions in fact motivated by considerations other than stock-
holder profit as an instrument to that end and therefore entitled to
judicial deference, conservative corporate theorists nonetheless
thought that if that was so there was still utility—or even a more com-
pelling necessity—to recognizing that stockholder wealth maximiza-
tion was the only proper end of corporate governance.57  By being
clear about that singular end, at least the law would make pretense by
managers easier to expose and check their ability to pursue idiosyn-
cratic ends with corporate funds.
Economists and legal scholars, working within the emerging law
and economics movement, added to the lexicon with terms such as
agency costs (to reflect the potential that the managers on the control
side of the ownership and control equation would extract “rents” at
the expense of stockholders)58 and rational passivity (to describe why
stockholders would rationally diversify and primarily use their right to
exit their investments rather than their legal rights to vote and sue to
protect themselves as investors), to explain why it was important to
focus managers on the singular end of profit maximization.59
D. The Social Good: Business Should Focus on What It Does
Best—Creating Wealth—and Leave the Protection of
Other Interests to the Political Process
The notion that corporations are devoted to making money leads
to the question: What about the rest of society?  Conservative corpo-
rate theory has two answers.
First and foremost, conservative corporate theory believes that
for-profit corporations can and do benefit society generally by increas-
ing societal wealth.60  If corporations are profitable, that will make
bent managers, who can justify virtually any decision they make on the grounds that it
benefits some constituency of the firm.” (emphasis omitted)).
57 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION, supra note 24, at 422 (“Directors who are re- R
sponsible to everyone are accountable to no one. . . .  [T]he shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion norm . . . provides a forceful reminder of where the director’s loyalty lies.”).
58 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 340 n.52 (1976); see also POSNER,
supra note 20, at 529–32 (noting that “agency costs” is the modern term for the “control R
problem,” and defining them as “the costs to the principal of obtaining faithful and effec-
tive performance by his agents”).
59 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 197, 286–90; MANNE & WALLICH, supra R
note 21, at 69 (rebuttal of Manne). R
60 This theory was set out by Professors Easterbrook and Fischel:
[M]aximizing profits for equity investors assists the other “constituencies”
automatically. . . .  A successful firm provides jobs for workers and goods
and services for consumers.  The more appealing the goods to consumers,
the more profit (and jobs).  Prosperity for stockholders, workers, and com-
munities goes hand in glove with better products for consumers.
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their investors better off, and those investors can spend that wealth
not only on their own families, but in buying goods and services, in-
creasing demand and the potential for others to get jobs and become
wealthier. Moreover, to make profits, corporations have an incentive
to develop new products and services, which have the potential to in-
crease the quality of life of consumers. To make and deliver such
goods, corporations employ workers and buy products and services
from other businesses. Indeed, because stockholders are entitled to
get dividends and other payments only if the corporation is able to
meet its obligations to its creditors,61 conservative corporate theory
regards it as optimal for everyone that corporations be governed to
maximize stockholder wealth, as that best assures (under their theory)
that legal claimants will have their claims satisfied.62  On a less theoret-
ical level, conservative corporate theory also accepts the notion that
corporate managers are likely to be much better and more legiti-
mately positioned to determine what decision will produce the most
profit, than to determine what corporate policies are most likely to
advance a diverse set of debatable social and moral objectives.63 As a
practical matter, it is best that managers stick to the most obvious pur-
pose of the for-profit corporation, which is generating profits, and
leave to actual human beings the pursuit of noneconomic social
ends.64
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 38. R
Ronald Chen and Professor Hanson, quoting this passage, have further explained
(while expressing suspicion about corporate law theory): “Moreover, as stock ownership
among workers and consumers has grown in recent decades—through pension and mu-
tual funds—corporate profits are now being spread to a much larger percentage of the
population, giving more people a direct stake in maximizing the size of the corporate pie.”
Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy
and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 47 (2004); see also WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER
KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 287–88
(2003) (“[F]raming the board’s mission as maximizing shareholder welfare also serves to
maximize the welfare of other corporate constituencies and society as a whole.”); FRIED-
MAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 17, at 133 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS R
421 (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co. 1950) (1776)); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Propor-
tionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 261 n.45 (1989) (“[M]aximizing gains to target share-
holders serves the broader objectives of shareholder and social welfare.”); Mark J. Roe, The
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063,
2073 (2001) (noting that it is considered a “norm” in business circles that wealth will flow
from shareholders to the benefit of other constituencies).
61 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2013) (corporations can only pay dividends if
they have a statutory surplus or net profits).
62 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 38 (“[M]aximizing profits for equity R
investors assists the other ‘constituencies’ automatically.”).
63 See id. at 96 (discussing the efficiency of information markets and concluding that
“[m]anagers must perform well to keep share prices high; if they do not, they can expect
to be replaced”).
64 E.g., POSNER, supra note 20, at 572–74. R
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Recognizing that this could be seen as callous and as leaving soci-
ety at risk from overly avid corporate pursuit of profit, conservative
corporate theory has a clear answer. Rather than deny that corpora-
tions focused on maximizing stockholder profits might have a rational
incentive to externalize costs to other constituencies and society as a
whole through unfair treatment of their workers, environmental
shortcuts, and other methods that leave the corporation with higher
profits by off-loading risks to others, conservative corporate theory ac-
cepts that externality risk must be addressed.65 But conservative corpo-
rate theory takes a clear-eyed view of the matter.
Instead of entrusting corporate managers whose ultimate right to
office depends solely upon election by stockholders to protect other
constituencies and society from externality risk, conservative corpo-
rate theory looks to the political process as the legitimate and sound
form of protection.66  Relatedly, conservative corporate theory argues
that certain constituencies—creditors and workers, for example—can
protect themselves by contracting.67  But, as labor movement trends
arguably show, the utility of contracting might itself be influenced by
regulatory policy.68  Elected officials have the ability to put in place
65 BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION, supra note 24, at 425 (“Corporate conduct doubtless R
generates negative externalities.  In appropriate cases, such externalities should be con-
strained through general welfare legislation, tort litigation, and other forms of regulation.”
(footnote omitted)); Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 17, at 4; Donald J. Kochan, R
Corporate Social Responsibility in a Remedy-Seeking Society: A Public Choice Perspective, 17 CHAP. L.
REV. 413, 427 (2014) (“One of the most important constraints on wealth-maximization is
that a corporation is duty-bound to comply with the law.  As [Professor Robert] Clark ex-
plains, the view holds that ‘[p]rofits should be made as large as possible, within the [lim-
ited legitimate] constraints,’ which first and foremost includes compliance with the law.”
(quoting CLARK, supra note 24, at 678)). R
66 BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION, supra note 24, at 429 (“[T]he federal government has R
intervened to provide through general welfare legislation many . . . protections for [work-
ers] . . . .  The Family & Medical Leave Act grants unpaid leave for medical and other
family problems.  The Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) mandates
safe working conditions.  Plant closing laws require notice of layoffs.  Civil rights laws pro-
tect against discrimination of various sorts.  And so on.  Such targeted legislative ap-
proaches are a preferable solution to the externalities created by corporate conduct.
General welfare laws designed to deter corporate conduct through criminal and civil sanc-
tions imposed on the corporation, its directors, and its senior officers are more efficient
than stakeholderist tweaking of director fiduciary duties.” (footnotes omitted)); see Macey,
supra note 56, at 42 (“If actions of a firm are genuinely detrimental to a local commu- R
nity, . . . that community can appeal to their elected representatives in state and local
government for redress.”); see also Arrow, supra note 18, at 130. R
67 See, e.g., William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
385, 393–94 (1990); Macey, supra note 56, at 26. R
68 Although the decline in private sector unionism has many causes, scholars have
argued that the decline in NLRA enforcement during recent decades contributed to the
sharper decline in unions in the United States in comparison to our economic allies. See,
e.g., Morris M. Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance: Understanding the Decline of Unioni-
zation in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519, 534–35 (2001), available at http://wwwhhh.oit
.umn.edu/people/mkleiner/pdf/unionization.pdf; W. Craig Riddell, Unionization in Ca-
nada and the United States: A Tale of Two Countries, in SMALL DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER:
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 23 12-JAN-15 14:48
2015] CONSERVATIVE COLLISION COURSE? 357
forms of external regulation to protect society as a whole.69  This view
has been most forcefully articulated by conservatives responding to
the debate over corporate social responsibility.  Corporate social re-
sponsibility can be defined as the voluntary pursuit by corporations
organized for profit of “social ends where this pursuit conflicts with
the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit.”70  Like the
profit-maximizing norm, the debate over corporate social responsibil-
ity can be traced back to the exchange between Merrick Dodd and
Adolf Berle.71  By the 1950s, Berle had conceded defeat, but other
scholars had not.72  Theodore Levitt wrote in the Harvard Business Re-
view in 1958 that corporations should focus on making profits, and
leave charitable and welfare programs to the government and other
societal actors.73  Levitt believed that corporations could only function
effectively if they concentrated on profit, and in fact was so bold as to
claim that the trouble with corporations was that they were “not nar-
rowly profit-oriented enough.”74  But, he also believed that corpora-
tions were unsuited to running a welfare state.75  The net result, for
Levitt, was that corporations should unashamedly stick to making
money, and government should regulate corporations and society to
ensure that our society is fair.  Business had “only two responsibili-
ties—to obey the elementary canons of everyday face-to-face civility
LABOR MARKETS AND INCOME MAINTENANCE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 143 (David
Card & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1993), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c111
47; Claude Fischer, Labor’s Laboring Effort, BERKELEY BLOG (Sept. 9, 2010), http://blogs.ber
keley.edu/2010/09/09/labor%E2%80%99s-laboring-effort; Kris Warner, The Real Reason
for the Decline of American Unions, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Jan. 23, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-23/the-real-reason-for-the-decline-of-american-unions
.html.
69 Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 781, 792 n.46 (1986) (“[S]pecific legislation [is] designed to protect from the
effects of corporate behavior.  For example, there is anti-trust and product safety legisla-
tion to protect consumers; legislation to protect the health and safety, right to collectively
bargain, and pension benefits of employees; fraudulent conveyance laws and federal bank-
ruptcy laws to protect creditors; and state and federal legislation to protect the environ-
ment.”); see also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION, supra note 24, at 425. R
70 David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3
(1979).  The proviso in the definition is important.  As Lord Bowen said, “[C]harity has no
business to sit at boards of directors quâ charity.  There is, however, a kind of charitable
dealing which is for the interest of those who practise it, and to that extent and in that
garb . . . charity may sit at the board, but for no other purpose.”  Hutton v. W. Cork Ry. Co.,
[1883] 23 Ch. D. 654, 673 (Eng.).  More graphically, “[t]he law does not say that there are
to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for
the benefit of the company.” Id.
71 See supra notes 30, 52–54. See generally C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate R
Social Responsibility: An Historical Perspective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77
(2002).
72 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR,, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954).
73 Levitt, supra note 15. R
74 Id. at 44.
75 Id.
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(honesty, good faith, and so on) and to seek material gain.”76  Other-
wise, the corporation would turn into the “twentieth-century
equivalent of the medieval Church[,] . . . ministering to the whole
man and molding him and society in the image of the corporation’s
narrow ambitions and its essentially unsocial needs.”77
Levitt’s view was famously amplified by Milton Friedman in 1970.
Friedman argued that “the social responsibility of business is to in-
crease its profits”:78
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive
is an employe of the owners of the business.  He has direct responsi-
bility to his employers.  That responsibility is to conduct the busi-
ness in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of
the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical
custom.79
Friedman pointed out that stockholders elect directors to act as their
agents, and, if the directors are to exercise a “social responsibility”
rather than act in their principals’ interests, they must spend the cor-
poration’s money in a different manner from that which the stock-
holders would have wanted.80  Friedman argued that when
corporations engage in social responsibility, they are undertaking gov-
ernmental functions that they are not qualified to undertake, and
that, in any case, directors have no good idea how to discharge their
social-responsibility duties.81
For-profit corporations should therefore stick to trying to make
money within the “rules of the game” set by government.  It was gov-
ernment’s job to set those rules in the public interest and to put in
place what regulatory standards were needed to protect those affected
by corporate profit seeking.  Through this more legitimate means,
along with the legal priority over equity as claimants to corporate as-
sets in the event of shortfalls and the protections afforded by contract
rights, other corporate constituencies were adequately protected.
76 Id. at 49.
77 Id. at 44.
78 Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 17, at 33; see also Bainbridge, Director Pri- R
macy, supra note 24, at 564 (“Milton Friedman’s famous essay on corporate social responsi- R
bility remains the classic statement of the traditional shareholder primacy model . . . .”).
79 Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 17, at 33 (emphasis added). R
80 See id.
81 Id.; see also FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 17, at 133–34 (questioning whether R
businessmen can actually discern what constitutes a social responsibility and whether it is
appropriate for businessmen to undertake public functions in their capacity as representa-
tives of a private enterprise); cf. MANNE & WALLICH, supra note 21, at 30 (Manne: “[W]e R
have no definition of a social welfare function that is universally acceptable.  This strongly
suggests that any effort to maximize public good by private effort or otherwise is doomed
to failure.”).
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Everyone was better off by this divide, because it left corporations bet-
ter positioned to do what they do best to improve social welfare—
create wealth—while leaving protection of the public to institutions
having more legitimacy to do so, because they owed their authority
directly to a human electorate focused on the full range of human
concerns.
II
CITIZENS UNITED AND ITS EFFECT ON CORPORATE
INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
In 2002, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act,
the country’s consolidated election law governing campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures.82  The amendment came in the form of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, better known as the McCain-
Feingold Act.83  Most importantly for the Citizens United case, § 203 of
McCain-Feingold prevented corporations and unions from spending
money directly from their treasuries on any “electioneering communi-
cation,” which was defined as any broadcast that referred to a clearly
identified federal candidate within thirty days of a primary or sixty
days of a general election.84  Even before McCain-Feingold, corpora-
tions and unions were not permitted to make direct contributions to
candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocated the
election or defeat of a candidate.85  Nonetheless, McCain-Feingold
did not prevent corporations and unions from helping their employ-
ees, stockholders, and members to pool their resources; corporations
and unions were allowed to use funds from their PACs for both elec-
tioneering communications and express advocacy.86  But, of course,
PACs could only use funds voluntarily contributed by corporate em-
ployees, stockholders, or union members who specifically chose to
have the PAC act as a vehicle of expression on their collective
behalf.87
82 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codi-
fied as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56 (2006)).
83 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. No. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 607, 36 U.S.C. § 510, 47 U.S.C. § 315, and in sections of 2 U.S.C.).
84 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b(a), 441b(b)(2) (2006).
85 See id. § 441b(a) (“It is unlawful for . . . any corporation . . . or any labor organiza-
tion, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any [federal] elec-
tion . . . or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held
to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices . . . .”).
86 See id. § 441b(b)(2) (“[T]he term ‘contribution or expenditure’ . . . shall not in-
clude . . . the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate
segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation, labor organization,
membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock.”).
87 See id. § 441b(b)(3) (“It shall be unlawful . . . for such a fund to make a contribu-
tion . . . by utilizing money . . . secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial
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Citizens United was an unlikely case for the Supreme Court to
render a broad ruling overruling the application of a statute passed
with bipartisan support to the involvement of massive, for-profit cor-
porations in the political process.88  The plaintiff and petitioner in
Citizens United was a nonprofit advocacy group, Citizens United, which
wanted to air a movie attacking Hillary Clinton, entitled Hillary: The
Movie, during the 2008 Democratic primaries.89  Citizens United
sought a preliminary injunction against the Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC) to enjoin it from enforcing the provisions of McCain-Fein-
gold against it and declaratory relief that section 203 was facially
unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to the movie,90 but
then it voluntarily dismissed its facial challenge.91  Citizens United
also claimed that the disclosure requirements of McCain-Feingold
were unconstitutional.92  The three-judge district court denied the re-
lief sought.93
In its direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Citizens United did
not press its abandoned claim that section 203 of McCain-Feingold
was facially unconstitutional.94  But after hearing oral argument, the
Court itself broadened the case from a narrow challenge addressing
the application of section 203 to the nonprofit corporation Citizens
United and the movie it made, to a sweeping facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the restrictions that McCain-Feingold placed on
corporate and union “independent expenditures” in federal elections.
The Court asked for new briefing on this question, which had not
been litigated previously, and scheduled the case for another round of
oral argument.95
After broadening the case, the Citizens United majority struck
down section 203 to the extent that it limited corporations and unions
to using PAC money for electioneering communications and express
advocacy.96  The practical effect of Citizens United was that corpora-
reprisals, or the threat of force, job discrimination, or financial reprisals; or by dues, fees,
or other moneys required as a condition of membership in a labor organization . . . .”).
88 See Dibadj, supra note 3, at 40 (noting that Citizens United is a “puzzling opinion” R
because, in part, the “Court could have decided the case on much narrower grounds”).
89 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319–20 (2010).
90 See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278–80 (D.D.C. 2008).
91 558 U.S. at 397 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92 See 530 F. Supp. 2d at 280–81.
93 See id. at 280–82.
94 558 U.S. at 397 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95 Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932, 932 (2009).
96 558 U.S. at 365–66.  The requirements in McCain-Feingold that the Court struck
down actually have the same effect as the “opt-in” approach that the Supreme Court has
held that the First Amendment requires if a union is to create a special fund for use in an
election campaign.  In Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012), the Court
held that the First Amendment prohibited a union from assessing members a mandatory
extra charge in order to fight California ballot propositions without giving the members
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tions or unions could make unlimited independent expenditures in
support of candidates out of their own treasury.  The decision also
invalidated analogous state restrictions on independent corporate po-
litical expenditures.97  In so ruling, the Court overturned two of its
prior decisions, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 98 and
McConnell v. FEC,99 which upheld similar campaign finance laws at
times when the Court already had a conservative majority.
In Austin, the Court was asked to review the constitutionality of a
Michigan law that prohibited a corporation from making indepen-
dent political expenditures out of its general treasury.100  The law per-
mitted corporations to make independent expenditures out of a
“segregated fund”—i.e., its PAC—for which it could solicit contribu-
tions from certain persons “associated with the corporation.”101  The
Austin Court found, by a 6–3 vote, that Michigan’s statute did not vio-
late the First Amendment.  The Court accepted the holding of its pre-
vious ruling in First National Bank v. Bellotti that “[t]he mere fact that
the [speaker] is a corporation does not remove its speech from the
ambit of the First Amendment,” but held that Michigan’s statute was
“narrowly tailored” to the “compelling state interest” it was designed
the opportunity to opt out.  By contrast, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court took exactly
the opposite view, and held that corporations were denied their First Amendment rights by
being required to restrict their political funding to those funds raised specifically by volun-
tary, opt-in contributions from stockholders who chose to give to the corporate PAC for
that specific purpose. See generally 558 U.S. at 336–41 (holding that McCain-Feingold’s
“prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is . . . a ban on speech”).  Distin-
guished scholars, such as Professor Fisk and Dean Chemerinksy, have found Knox and Citi-
zens United difficult to reconcile, especially because, as they point out, union members have
more protections over use of their funds and more rights to influence union conduct than
stockholders of corporations do. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1069–70 (argu- R
ing that the Knox majority’s policy preference for opt-in rules has no constitutional basis);
id. at 1059–60 (“Members have rights under statute or under most unions’ constitutions
and bylaws to vote on the assessment of dues, on ratification of a collective bargaining
agreement, and on the leadership of the union.  Shareholders have far fewer rights to
protect their interests through the procedures of corporate democracy.” (footnote
omitted)).
97 In approximately half the states, state law restricted corporations and unions from
making independent expenditures in elections.  Ian Urbina, 24 States’ Laws Open to Attack
After Campaign Finance Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
01/23/us/politics/23states.html.  These laws, for all practical purposes, were invalidated
by American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam).
Some states have reacted to Citizens United by imposing more stringent disclosure require-
ments for independent expenditures. See Robert M. Stern, CORPORATE REFORM COALITION,
SUNLIGHT STATE BY STATE AFTER Citizens United (2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/sunlight-state-by-state-report.pdf.
98 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  The Austin Court included Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and O’Connor.
99 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  The McConnell Court included Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, O’Connor, and Thomas.
100 494 U.S. at 654.
101 Id. at 656.
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to serve.102 Austin said that a state may prevent a corporation from
using its general treasury funds for making political expenditures be-
cause of the distorting effect of such expenditures: Michigan’s statute
was a bulwark against “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the cor-
porate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s sup-
port for the corporation’s political ideas.”103
In McConnell, the Court reviewed the same provisions of McCain-
Feingold that it would later declare unconstitutional in Citizens
United.104  There, however, the Court found that the statute was consti-
tutional by a 5–4 vote.105  It found that federal restrictions on the use
of corporate or union treasury funds to pay for electioneering com-
munications did not violate the First Amendment, and specifically up-
held § 203.106  The Court found that Congress had a compelling
interest in stanching the “virtual torrent” of corporate- and union-
funded advertising immediately preceding federal elections,107 and re-
peated Austin’s concerns about “the corrosive and distorting effects”
of aggregated corporate wealth on the political process.108
102 Id. at 657 (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
103 Id. at 660.
104 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114.
105 Id. at 209.
106 Id. at 203–09.
107 Id. at 207.
108 Id. at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).  Since Citizens United, the Supreme
Court has further weakened McCain-Feingold’s limits on money entering politics.  In
McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court struck down McCain-Feingold’s aggregate limits on how
much individuals may contribute to candidates and committees. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014)
(plurality opinion).  Under McCain-Feingold, an individual was permitted in the
2013–2014 election cycle to contribute no more than $48,600 to federal electoral candi-
dates and $74,600 to other political committees.  2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2012); 78 Fed.
Reg. 8,530, 8,532 (Feb. 6, 2013) (detailing inflation indexing).  The McCutcheon Court
ruled that these limits, which were originally part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 and had been explicitly approved in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, were unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 38 (1976) (per curiam) (“The [Act’s] limited, additional restriction on associational
freedom imposed by the overall ceiling is . . . no more than a corollary of the basic individ-
ual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally valid.”).  The Court
left in place only the base limits of $5,200 per candidate per electoral cycle, leaving wealthy
donors to contribute to as many candidates and political committees as they chose.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 (“[W]e have previously upheld [the base limits] as serving
the permissible objective of combatting corruption.”); see 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1); 78 Fed.
Reg. 8,530, 8,532. Central to the Court’s reasoning in McCutcheon was its view—expressed
in Citizens United—that the government may only attempt to limit money in politics for the
very specific purpose of preventing legislators from receiving money for political favors. See
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1445–46 (holding that Congress may permissibly limit ac-
tual and apparent “quid pro quo” corruption); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
359–60 (2010) (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for politi-
cal favors[.]” (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497
(1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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III
CITIZENS UNITED IS IN TENSION WITH KEY PREMISES OF
CONSERVATIVE CORPORATE THEORY
Under Citizens United, a corporation may make unlimited political
expenditures.109  It is important to note that these expenditures will
be made by the management of the corporation: under the traditional
allocation of power within American corporations, stockholders will
not have a vote on them.110  The corporate law premises on which
Citizens United was decided can reasonably be seen as diverging from
conservative corporate theory in several important respects.
First, in Citizens United, the majority rejected the notion that
McCain-Feingold’s restriction on direct use of the corporate treasury
for political purposes could be justified by a desire to ensure that
stockholders were not required to subsidize political views they did
not embrace.111  The majority indicated that if stockholders did not
like the way in which corporations were spending their funds, they
could use the “procedures of corporate democracy” to elect different
directors, amend the charter, or file a derivative suit to challenge the
expenditure.112
But conservative corporate theory is founded in important part
on the observation that stockholders are not well positioned even to
monitor management’s fidelity to a profit-maximization goal.113  Fur-
thermore, conservative corporate theory understands that it will often
be irrational for stockholders to use their statutory rights to vote, pro-
pose corporate governance changes and new board members, or sue,
rather than simply sell their stock, if they fear that management has
strayed from the most profitable path or engaged in improper, dis-
loyal conduct.114  The notion that stockholders are therefore well
positioned to constrain managerial use of corporate funds for political
109 558 U.S. at 365 (“Austin is overruled, so it provides no basis for allowing the Gov-
ernment to limit corporate independent expenditures.”).
110 See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 37, at 843–47 (“Shareholders do not R
necessarily have the power to order directors to follow any particular course of action.
Rather, the powers of shareholders are limited to what corporate statutes specify[ ]
and . . . the company’s constitutional documents.”); Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra
note 37, at 679–80. R
111 558 U.S. at 361–62.
112 Id. at 362 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
113 BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION, supra note 24, at 414; POSNER, supra note 20, at 556–58; R
Berle, supra note 53, at 1367–68. R
114 E.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 2 (1995) (“[S]hareholders rarely have the incentive to exercise their legal rights.  For
many individual shareholders, dissatisfaction with the management of the corporation re-
sults in the sale of the stock.  The so-called Wall Street Rule is that ‘rationally ignorant’
shareholders sell their shares rather than become involved in the internal affairs of the
corporation.”).
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purposes they disfavor is arguably inconsistent with foundations of
conservative corporate theory.115
In addition to exposing stockholders to the increased risk of hav-
ing managers make value-destroying political expenditures, the Citi-
zens United majority lumps all corporations together and concludes
that corporations are often formed as a method for their stockholders
to pool resources that can be used by the corporate managers to en-
gage in expression on behalf of the contributing providers of equity
capital.116  Of course, as to the actual plaintiff in the case, Citizens
United, that conclusion might have been the case, as its name, non-
profit nature, and corporate purposes indicate that was exactly why
the corporation was formed.117  But it is, of course, likely that McCain-
Feingold’s restrictions on direct political activity by corporations were
primarily directed at for-profit corporations, which hold most of the
wealth in our society.118  Conservative corporate theory is understand-
ably focused on for-profit corporations, because the rules for their
governance are broadly considered as having the most impact on soci-
ety’s welfare.
As has been pointed out, conservative corporate theory is
founded on an understanding that stockholders have diverse moral
and political beliefs and that their decision to invest in the stock of a
for-profit corporation does not constitute any consent to having the
corporate managers use corporate funds for political or social pur-
poses.119  Conservative corporate theorists believe that stockholders
115 A distinguished scholar has argued that there is empirical evidence suggesting that
political spending by corporate managers has not been beneficial, even when viewed solely
in terms of whether it increases firm profitability.  In comments to the Securities and
Exchange Commission in connection with a petition for an SEC rule requiring public com-
panies to disclose corporate political spending, Professor Coates marshaled a “Non-exhaus-
tive List of Studies Inconsistent with Corporate Political Activity Being Generally Good for
Shareholder Interests.” See Letter from John C. Coates IV to Elizabeth M. Murphy, SEC
(Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-1692.pdf; see also Letter from
John C. Coates IV to Elizabeth M. Murphy, SEC (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/4-637/4637-1473.pdf.  That nonexhaustive list was comprised of seventeen empiri-
cal studies, including Coates’s own study, casting doubt on the idea that political activity by
corporations produces better returns for stockholders. See John C. Coates IV, Corporate
Politics, Governance and Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
657, 658–59 (2012) [hereinafter Coates, Corporate Politics].
116 558 U.S. at 355–56.
117 See What We Do, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/what-we-do.aspx
(last visited Dec. 9, 2014) (“Citizens United Foundation (CUF) is . . . dedicated to inform-
ing the American people about public policy issues which relate to traditional American
values . . . .”).
118 The complaints against McCain-Feingold came primarily from those who were wor-
ried that the bill would limit the free speech rights of nonprofit corporations. See, e.g.,
Hearing on Campaign Finance Reform Before the Comm. on House Admin., 107th Cong. 1–8
(June 28, 2001) (statement of H. Rep. Bob Barr).
119 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV.
923, 961 (1984) (noting that the pursuit of ends other than profit maximization is “espe-
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invest solely in for-profit corporations to make money for themselves,
so it is illegitimate for corporate managers to spend corporate money
for any end other than maximizing profits for stockholders.120  That
is, conservative corporate theory is inconsistent with the idea that cor-
porations like General Electric, Wal-Mart, McDonald’s, etc., exist be-
cause their stockholders wish to come together and have those
corporations, through their managers, “speak” on behalf of the stock-
holders.121  This tension is strengthened by a growing reality of which
the Citizens United majority seemed to elide or of which it was even
unaware: the ever-growing “separation of ‘ownership from
ownership.’”122
IV
THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM OWNERSHIP
INCREASES THE TENSION BETWEEN CITIZENS UNITED
AND CONSERVATIVE CORPORATE THEORY
Citizens United deepened an existing tension in the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence: its divergent treatment
of corporations and unions.123  In Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
cially disturbing because profit maximization is the only goal for which we can at least
theoretically posit shareholder unanimity”); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 215 (2012) (criticizing the SEC’s proxy access
rules, because they allow a “small minority” of shareholders to use corporate funds to pro-
mote “general social and political causes,” rather than proposals that “a reasonable inves-
tor would believe . . . relevant to the value of his investment”); Greenwood, supra note 44, R
at 1040–41 (“The humans who stand behind the shares have various and conflicting goals,
as all people do: they want their shares to increase in value, of course, but they may also
want decent jobs for their kids or neighbors, attractive and safe cities, a clean environment,
and other things that, from time to time, conflict with the increase in value of their shares.
The corporate law system eliminates all these conflicting goals, leaving the agents with a
simple and clear directive: maximize shareholder value.”).
120 See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text. R
121 In a prior dissent, a member of the Citizens United majority made this point, stating:
“The Campbell Soup Company does not exist to promote a message[.]”  Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 467 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006); see
also Strine, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that most ordinary Americans invest in the stock R
market through intermediaries).
123 On the final day of the 2013–2014 Term, the Supreme Court decided Harris v.
Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), which may foreshadow an even greater disparity between
the treatment of corporations and unions.  As we describe in this Part, the Court held in
the 1977 case of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education that public-sector employees may be
required to contribute funds to union activities that are related to collective bargaining.
431 U.S. 209 (1977).  But, in Harris, the Court criticized Abood at length, describing it as
“something of an anomaly” and “questionable on several grounds.” Harris, 134 S. Ct. at
2627, 2632 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court found it “unnecessary” to over-
rule Abood to decide the case before it. Id. at 2638 n.19.  Nonetheless, the decision may
portend that the Supreme Court will restrict the ability of the governing bodies of unions
to collect funds from members to use for union activities by claiming that such use violates
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tion,124 Justice Stewart authored a unanimous decision striking down
as inconsistent with the First Amendment a Michigan law whereby a
union and a local government employer were allowed to agree that
every employee represented by a union in the bargaining process
could be charged a service fee equal to union dues, even if he was not
a member of the union.125  The Court ruled that unions were only
allowed to charge nonunion members costs associated with collective
bargaining activities and had to refund dues spent on “ideological ac-
tivities unrelated to collective bargaining.”126  The rationale was that it
violated the employees’ First Amendment right to be forced as a con-
dition of employment to have their wealth used by the union for pur-
poses—such as political activity—that the employees did not
support.127  Thus, unions were only allowed to use money raised from
members “who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are
not coerced into doing so against their will.”128
But Abood’s reasoning that the right of union members against
having their resources used for speech they did not approve is hard to
confine solely to unions.129  Indeed, the Court admitted that its logic
applied equally to the political speech of corporations.  The Court
held:
One of the principles underlying the Court’s decision in Buck-
ley v. Valeo was that contributing to an organization for the purpose
of spreading a political message is protected by the First Amend-
ment.  Because “[m]aking a contribution . . . enables like-minded
persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political
goals,” the Court reasoned that limitations upon the freedom to
contribute “implicate fundamental First Amendment interests.”
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather
than prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes
works no less an infringement of their constitutional rights.  For at
the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s
the expressive rights of union members.  Simultaneously, the Court has held that the ex-
pressive rights of stockholders, by contrast, act as no barrier to the use by corporations of
corporate funds for expressive speech of any kind, including speech encouraging the elec-
tion or defeat of specific candidates.  As we discuss in this Part, that inconsistency is hard to
ground in the actual facts regarding the relationship between ordinary investors and the
public companies in which their equity capital is ultimately invested.
124 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
125 Id. at 211.
126 Id. at 236.
127 Id. at 234.
128 Id. at 236.
129 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1085 (“[C]orporations and unions should R
be treated the same. . . .  [T]he question is whether to extend the treatment of corpora-
tions in Citizens United to unions or the treatment of unions in Abood to corporations.”).
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beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than
coerced by the State.130
Scholars such as Victor Brudney have argued that the logic from
Abood should extend to permit laws regulating political spending by
corporations because investors have little control over the day-to-day
business decisions of corporations and little choice but to invest.131
Brudney suggested that the state had a compelling interest “in the
need to protect individual stockholders against being forced to
choose between contributing to political or social expressions with
which they disagree or foregoing opportunities for profitable invest-
ment.”132  This was especially true because requiring corporations to
make political expenditures from voluntary contributions raised
through a PAC merely regulates how corporations may speak, not
whether they may do so.133
But the precedent laid down in Abood with regard to unions was
distinguished by the Court in Bellotti with regard to corporations for
two reasons: stockholders had the opportunity to vote out directors
who approved political expenditures they disagreed with134 or bring a
derivative suit to challenge the decision,135 and, if those options
130 Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
131 Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amend-
ment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 294 (1981) (“[W]ith respect to publicly held business corporations
not engaged in the communications business, the First Amendment does not preclude a
government requirement of stockholder consent that may effectively prohibit either some
or all noncommercial speech.”); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corpo-
rate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 113–14 (2010) (“[T]he operation of
markets is generally not sufficient to obviate the need for mandatory protection of minor-
ity shareholders.”); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After
Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 868 (2012) (“What Abood and its progeny call
into question is the requirement that public employees make contributions that could be
used, against their objection, for the purchase of corporate securities and the financing of
corporate political speech.”); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133,
202–10 (1998) (arguing that shareholders lack the power to discover political spending
before “[t]he damage has been done”). Fisk and Chemerinsky, by contrast, suggest that
Citizens United should be extended to unions.  Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1087. R
132 Brudney, supra note 131, at 268. R
133 Id. at 241 (“While other provisions of the Constitution may limit the government’s
power to prescribe the allocation of decisionmaking authority, the restrictions on govern-
ment power contained in the First Amendment do not address, or without more inhibit,
the government’s power to determine [how corporate decisions should be made].”).
134 See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794–95 (1978) (“Acting through their
power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corpora-
tion’s charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own
interests.”).
135 See id. at 795 (“[M]inority shareholders generally have access to the judicial remedy
of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for
improper corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of manage-
ment.”).  This point was criticized by Victor Brudney: “It is hard to see any distinction of
constitutional dimension between forbidding a corporation from engaging in certain be-
havior under penalty of criminal punishment for management, and permitting the threat
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failed, stockholders were able to sell their shares easily on the open
market.136  These strategies can be simplified into two concepts famil-
iar in corporate governance: voice and exit.137  The Court assumed in
Bellotti that stockholders were active and knowledgeable, and their in-
vestments were voluntary and firm-specific.138
Those assumptions are much less tenable today.  Even in the
1980s, the class of Americans who were invested in the stock market
was likely to be far more affluent than the average person,139 they
were more likely to buy and sell individual stocks through a broker
they chose,140 and ordinary American workers were typically not con-
sidered part of the investing class because they were more likely to
look to a defined-benefit pension plan, social security, and quaintly,
money in savings accounts at banks as providing the basis for their
retirement.141  Moreover, union workplaces were more common at
the time.142  Thus, it was easier for the Court to embrace the idea that
of stockholder derivative suit against, or ouster of, management to deter such behav-
ior . . . .”  Brudney, supra note 131, at 242 (footnote omitted). R
136 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34 (“[A] stockholder invests in a corporation of his
own volition and is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason.”).
137 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DE-
CLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (discussing how dissatisfied members of
a group may quit the group or voice their dissatisfaction in order to improve it).
138 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793–94 (“[S]hareholders may decide, through the procedures
of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on public
issues.”). See generally Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revis-
ited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67
GEO. L.J. 1347, 1377 (1979) (discussing this premise of Bellotti).
139 See, e.g., FEDERAL RESERVE, 2010 SCF CHARTBOOK 509–10 (2010), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/files/2010_SCF_Chartbook.pdf (showing that, in
1989, less than 30% of American families in the middle quintile by income had stock hold-
ings, as opposed to over 75% of the top decile, and that the holdings of investors in the
middle quintile were almost ten times less valuable than the holdings of investors in the
top decile); see also Michael Haliassos & Carol C. Bertaut, Why Do So Few Hold Stocks?, 105
ECON. J. 1110, 1111 tbl.1 (1995) (showing similar data for 1983).
140 See, e.g., John C. Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18,
2010, 11:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487034365045746
40523013840290 (“Institutional investors held less than 10% of all U.S. stocks in the mid-
1950s, 35% in 1975, and 53% a decade ago, and now institutional investors own and con-
trol almost 70% of the shares of U.S. corporations.”).
141 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD A. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW 282–83 (6th ed.
2014) (describing the importance of social security to lower-income retirees, along with
private savings); EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., RETIREMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES
OVER THE PAST QUARTER-CENTURY (2007), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publica
tions/facts/0607fact.pdf (showing the relative prevalence of defined-benefit pension plans
in the 1980s); Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on Retirement, 12
ELDER L.J. 245, 251–53 (2004) (describing retirees’ traditional “three-legged stool” of so-
cial security, private pensions, and private savings).
142 See GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN
THE UNITED STATES 10, app.A & tbl.A1 (2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cor
nell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=key_workplace (noting that union
membership peaked in 1979 with an estimated 21 million members—approximately 21.2%
of all employed workers—and tracking the ensuing decline in union membership).
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“shareholders possess far greater freedom because of competitive mar-
kets: They can easily shift their funds to other companies if they disap-
prove of policies, whereas the rank and file members of unions have
no such option.”143
The Citizens United majority appears to have adopted this simplis-
tic idea of the relationship between stockholders and for-profit, public
corporations.  In terms of exercising their “rights” to constrain corpo-
rations from using corporate funds for political purposes they do not
support, the Supreme Court seemed to think of their parents sitting at
home and saying, “Darn it, I’m going to vote no against the manage-
ment slate because they supported the election (or defeat) of candi-
date X because of his views on issue Y.”  In the majority opinion,
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that there was “little evidence of abuse
that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of
corporate democracy.’”144  And in his concurring opinion, Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts asserted that modern technology makes shareholder
objections more effective, because rapid disclosures “provide share-
holders and citizens with the information needed to hold corpora-
tions and elected officials accountable for their positions and
supporters.”145
Many conservative corporate law theorists’ own arguments sug-
gest that even stockholders who own stock directly in a public corpora-
tion are unlikely to find it worth the time and effort to incur the costs
of voice over an issue like corporate political spending.146  It is un-
likely that stockholders would ever take advantage of their rights of
voice or exit to express their disagreement with corporate political
spending that they disapproved of: even conservative commentators
who support eliminating limits on corporate political spending,
acknowledge that voting is usually irrational, and selling stock may
leave the stockholders with a loss, particularly if the market as a whole
also does not care for the corporation’s political speech.147  But, even
143 Romano, supra note 119, at 1000 n.232. R
144 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
145 Id. at 370 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); cf. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460
(2014) (plurality opinion) (arguing that Internet disclosure acts as a prophylactic against
corruption, “[b]ecause massive quantities of information can be accessed at the click of a
mouse”).
146 E.g., MANNE & WALLICH, supra note 21, at 96 (discussion of Manne); POSNER, supra R
note 20, at 556; see also Greenwood, supra note 44, at 1025–29 (explaining why “exit”—the R
ability of stockholders to sell if they do not support the corporation’s speech—is not a
viable answer to the problem of corporations using treasury wealth for expressive purposes
not shared by their investors).
147 See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 114, at 65 (“[I]f corporate managers engage
in speech that reduces the market price . . . because it indicates a lack of management
probity, sale by individual shareholders at the reduced price is not a complete remedy.”).
Scholars also point out the futility of exit in this situation, because exit “would leave the
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more important, the practical realities of stock market ownership have
changed in ways that deprive most stockholders of both their right to
voice and their right of exit.148  There is now less reason to conclude
that investors have any more ability to avoid subsidizing corporate
speech they do not favor than workers have in subsidizing union
speech.149  Most of the stock of American public corporations is no
longer owned directly by human beings, but instead by institutional
investors such as mutual or pension funds.150  Most Americans have
become “forced capitalists” who must give over a large portion of their
wealth to the stock market to fund their retirements and their chil-
dren’s educations.151  As a result, the actual human beings whose capi-
tal is invested by these intermediaries do not directly vote on who sits
on corporate boards,152 do not have the option to buy and sell the
securities of particular companies on any basis, and only retain very
limited rights of exit from the market without facing expropriatory
levels of taxation.153
Even the few remaining Americans who have access to a so-called
defined-benefit pension plan are usually required, as a condition of
employment, to have a portion of their salary devoted to the funding
investor’s enterprise free to use his previously contributed funds for the very political pur-
poses he finds offensive.”  Brudney, supra note 131, at 270; Winkler, supra note 131, at 168 R
(selling shares “does not so much as solve the problem of dissenting shareholders as ignore
it” because “[t]he danger the state seeks to prevent—corporate managers using other peo-
ple’s money for electoral causes they disagree with—occurs when the money is spent”).
148 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some
Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1081–82 (2008).
149 Professor Sachs notes that “[j]ust as there are alternatives to employment in union-
ized firms, there exist a range of alternatives to investing in corporate securities,” but he
also acknowledges that returns to bonds have historically been far lower than stock returns.
Sachs, supra note 131, at 838–40.  Given this, we believe that a typical person wishing to R
save for her retirement or her children’s education has no rational choice but to invest in
mutual funds that invest in stock of public corporations.  Sachs also acknowledges that
state employees are generally under a direct compulsion to have their pension contribu-
tions invested in the stock market: forty-four states have a requirement that their employ-
ees invest in public pension plans, over which the employees have no control. Id. at
866–69.
150 See, e.g., MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVEST-
MENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 29 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20101111_ConferenceBoard
.pdf (institutional ownership of equities in the 1,000 largest U.S. companies increased from
57.1% in 1994 to 68.6% in 2008); Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Inves-
tors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4 (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/jacobslevycenter/files/
14.12.Keim.pdf (institutional investors held 67% of equities by the end of 2010, compared
with only about 5% in 1945).
151 Strine, supra note 148, at 1081–82. R
152 See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership
from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1826–38 (2011).
153 Strine, supra note 6, at 4. R
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of a pension plan.154  That pension plan’s fiduciaries will then make
investments, consisting in material part of investments in the stocks of
for-profit corporations (or of investments in investment funds making
such investment, to add another layer), on behalf of the plan that will
provide the source of the pension payments for beneficiaries of the
plan.155  The pension plan’s board then selects the investments for the
plan, and the human pension beneficiaries have no influence over
that process.  It is implausible to think that the beneficiaries are
choosing to empower the plan’s fiduciaries to monitor on their behalf
the political activity of corporations whose stock the plan buys.156  It is
equally difficult to imagine how the plan fiduciaries would come up
with a responsible method by which to develop monitoring guidelines
about political involvement, given that their plan beneficiaries pre-
sumably have diverse views about the range of issues that factor into
actual voting by actual humans affected on the many dimensions ac-
tual humans are by public policy.
Furthermore, because a pension plan’s board must act in accor-
dance with certain federal standards under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), a strong argument can be made that in
considering guidelines on political spending by corporations plan fi-
duciaries have to limit themselves as a matter of law from considering
any concern other than enhancing the investment value of the
plan.157  This is a narrow focus inconsistent with the full range of con-
154 See  NRTA: AARP’S EDUCATOR COMMUNITY, NRTA PENSION EDUCATION TOOLKIT:
PENSION CONTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS 1–2 (2010), available at http://assets.aarp.org/www
.aarp.org_/articles/work/contribution-requirements.pdf (“[C]ontributions come from
both employers (the city or state) and employees, who contribute to the pension directly
out of their own paycheck each month. . . .  On average, public sector employees contrib-
ute 5% of each paycheck to their pension.”).
155 EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY RE-
SPONSIBILITIES (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/fiduciaryre
sponsibility.html.
156 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 318
(2008) (“[T]he vast majority of public pension funds do not participate extensively in cor-
porate governance . . . .”); Michael E. Murphy, Pension Plans and the Prospects of Corporate
Self-Regulation, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 503, 504 (2007) (stating that pension plans are
passive in the same way as other institutional investors); id. at 528 (“[Plan beneficiaries] are
in fact very unlikely to be concerned with proxy voting . . . .”).
157 Dep’t of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 73
Fed. Reg. 61,731, 61,734 (Oct. 17, 2008) (“The use of pension plan assets by plan fiducia-
ries to further policy or political issues through proxy resolutions that have no connection
to enhancing the economic value of the plan’s investment in a corporation would, in the
view of the Department, violate the prudence and exclusive purpose requirements of [29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A), (B)].”); see 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (“[A] fiduciary shall discharge
his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
and . . . for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their benefi-
ciaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan . . . .”); see also
Greenwood, supra note 44, at 1046–47 (explaining the difficulties for institutional investors R
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cerns that motivate their beneficiaries in making decisions on how to
vote in political elections.  Indeed, conservative corporate theory
would acknowledge that adding another level of agency between the
ultimate humans whose capital is at stake and the control of that capi-
tal would increase, not decrease, the illegitimacy of the corporate
board’s use of corporate funds for political purposes.158
Conservative corporate theory would also seem to acknowledge
another factor that adds to this illegitimacy concern.  As defined-
benefit plans decrease in prevalence, most American workers are, as a
practical matter, being required to save for retirement by putting
money aside from every paycheck into a 401(k) plan.159  Typically,
such plans do not give workers the option to use their funds to buy
the stock of particular public companies directly; instead, workers
must invest their money in one of the mutual fund options chosen by
their employer.160  As an economic matter, conservative corporate
theory would also embrace the idea that workers would be foolish to
try to buy and sell particular stocks for themselves, as opposed to buy-
ing an appropriate allocation of stock and bond mutual funds that are
indexed to representative segments of the market.161
As in the case of the beneficiaries of defined-benefit pension
plans, Americans investing in 401(k) plans do not have a direct vote
of voting shares or investing on any other ground than maximizing the value of their own
investors’ investments).
158 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 58, at 308–10; see also Armen A. Alchian & R
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777, 787–89 (1972); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 288–91 (1980).
159 Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate
Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 537 (2011) (“Stock ownership is
no longer a voluntary activity . . . .  The rapid rise in stock ownership has been fueled by
the proliferation of defined-contribution retirement plans provided by employers.”); see
also Jennifer S. Taub, Able But Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors To Advocate for
Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 848 (2009) (“[N]early two-thirds of fund investors
invest through employer-sponsored retirement plans.”).
160 Tucker, supra note 159, at 539 (“[T]he investments available in [retirement] plans R
are often severely restricted.  Employer plans are often limited to a list of approved stocks,
and, even more commonly, a limited list of participating mutual funds.”).
161 E.g., POSNER, supra note 20, at 596.  Studies show that funds that seek a market R
return by indexing and limiting trading costs outperform actively managed funds that seek
so-called alpha. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-
Section of Mutual Fund Returns, 65 J. FIN. 1915, 1922 (2010) (“The typical active fund trades
more than the typical passive fund, and active funds are likely to demand immediacy in
trading that pushes up costs.”); Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the
Period 1945–1964, 23 J. FIN. 389, 415 (1968) (“The evidence on mutual fund performance
discussed above indicates not only that these 115 mutual funds were on average not able to
predict security prices well enough to outperform a buy-the-market-and-hold policy . . . .”
(emphasis omitted)); Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971
to 1991, 50 J. FIN. 549, 571 (1995) (“Most investors would be considerably better off by
purchasing a low expense index fund, than by trying to select an active fund manager who
appears to possess a ‘hot hand.’”).
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on who constitute the boards of directors of American public corpora-
tions.  Rather, the vote is controlled by the mutual funds themselves.
As with pension funds, it is difficult to figure out how funds such as
PIMCO Total Return, American Funds Capital Income Builder, Van-
guard Total Stock Market Index Fund, Fidelity Contrafund, Black-
Rock Global Allocation Fund, or iShares Core S&P 500 would develop
responsible policies to monitor corporate political spending to reflect
the diverse views of their end-user investors.162
Perhaps unsurprisingly, major fund complexes such as Vanguard
and Fidelity state that they abstain on such corporate social responsi-
bility measures put forward by stockholders under SEC Rule 14a-8,
because decisions on such measures should be taken by management
and the board, not by stockholders.163  If mutual funds feel poorly
positioned to vote on specific social proposals,164 about which their
diverse investors likely disagree, they are even less likely to be able to
decide how to represent their diverse views in constraining or chan-
neling corporate political spending.165  In fact, to the extent these
162 As a distinguished professor observes, even if mutual funds could monitor corpo-
rate political spending, it would make little economic sense for them to do so.  Actively
managed funds prefer to free ride on other investors’ activism, and index funds are so cost-
conscious that they tend not to spend money on corporate governance activism. Given
these funds’ reluctance to spend time or money on issues more central to firm profits, it
seems likely they would have little interest in monitoring firm political spending.
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, at 245. R
163 Vanguard states that decisions on corporate and social policy matters “should be
the province of company management unless they have a significant, tangible impact on
the value of a fund’s investment and management is not responsive to the matter.” Van-
guard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/about/
vanguards-proxy-voting-guidelines (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).  One of Fidelity’s major
subadvisers, Geode, also abstains from such proposals. Corporate Governance and Proxy
Guidelines, FIDELITY, http://personal.fidelity.com/myfidelity/InsideFidelity/Invest
Expertise/governance.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
164 For examples of the variety of social proposals proposed by stockholders, see Resolu-
tions, AS YOU SOW, http://www.asyousow.org/our-work/current-resolutions/?program=&
ays_year=2013&initiative=&company=&keyword= (last visited Dec. 9, 2014) (one corporate
social responsibility advocacy organization’s list of stockholder resolutions in 2013); Share-
holder Resolutions, CERES, http://www.ceres.org/investor-network/resolutions (last visited
Dec. 9, 2014) (tracking stockholder resolutions on sustainability-related issues).
165 For example, BlackRock, which manages a huge amount of 401(k) and pension
funds, states that it “believe[s] that it is not the role of shareholders to suggest or approve
corporate political activities.” Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities, BLACKROCK (Apr.
2014), at 12, http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/fact-sheet/blk-
responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf.  Fidelity has thus far abstained from voting on all
political-spending resolutions. See FIDELITY, supra note 163; see also Jackie Cook, Corporate R
Political Spending and the Mutual Fund Vote: 2012 Proxy Season Analysis, CTR. FOR POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY (Dec. 2012), at *6, available at http://politicalaccountability.net/index
.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/7380 (finding that mutual funds voted in favor of cor-
porate political-disclosure resolutions only about one-third of the time in 2012).
Nor can mutual funds solve this problem by outsourcing voting decisions on political
and social matters to proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).  The
use of proxy advisors simply places another layer of agency between the human who is the
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funds will vote on social issues, they say they will do so based solely on
a desire to increase the equity returns of the corporation, a monocu-
lar focus quite different from that of the actual human investors
whose equity they control.166
As a practical matter, Americans cannot avoid putting the bulk of
their savings into 401(k) plans if they wish to save for retirement
responsibly.  The tax incentives for saving in this manner are power-
ful.167  But these incentives come with a downside.  If a worker at-
tempts to withdraw funds early from a 401(k) investment, the law
imposes a severe penalty to ensure that such investments are not used
as a tax dodge.168  Thus, if a withdrawal is made before the worker hits
ultimate beneficial owner of the stock and the exercise of the stock’s voting rights. See
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 158; Fama, supra note 158, at 290–95; Jensen & Meckling, R
supra note 58.  The central problem of legitimacy remains at all levels of agency.  Like
pension and mutual funds, proxy advisor firms have no principled manner in which to
make political judgments on behalf of equity investors with widely divergent political be-
liefs.  Nor do they have the institutional capacity to do so. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, R
at 258 (noting that in 2009, ISS “had to prepare voting recommendations with respect to
more than 37,000 issuers around the world,” and was thereby forced to “automate decision
making to the fullest possible extent”).
166 See, e.g., ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN, PROXY VOTING MANUAL 1, 11 (2013), available at
https://www.alliancebernstein.com/abcom/Our_Firm/Content/CGDocs/Proxy%20Vot
ing%20Manual.pdf (“Maximizing long-term shareholder value is our overriding concern
in considering [social, environmental, and governance] matters, so we consider the impact
of these proposals on the future earnings of the company.”); AM. FUNDS, PROXY VOTING
PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES 1, 11 (2014), available at https://www.americanfunds.com/
pdf/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf (“[W]e may support proposals . . . where we feel the
shareholder’s request is necessary for the success of the business or provides value to the
company and its shareholders.”); BLACKROCK, GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EN-
GAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 1, 7 (2014), available at http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-
us/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-1engprinciples-global-122011.pdf
(“The trigger for engagement on a particular [social, ethical, or environmental] concern is
our assessment that there is potential for material economic ramifications for sharehold-
ers.”); OPPENHEIMERFUNDS, PORTFOLIO PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND PORT-
FOLIO PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 1, 33 (2014), available at https://www.oppenheimerfunds
.com/doc/OFI_Proxy_Voting_Policy.pdf (“[OppenheimerFunds, Inc.] will only vote [for
proposals] that would clearly have a discernable positive impact on short-term or long-term
share value. . . .”).
167 See, e.g., Retirement Topics – Retirement Savings Contributions Credit (Saver’s Credit),
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-
Employee/Retirement-Topics-Retirement-Savings-Contributions-Credit-(Saver%E2%80%
99s-Credit) (last updated Oct. 23, 2014) (“The amount of the [tax] credit is 50%, 20% or
10% of your retirement plan or IRA contributions up to $2,000 ($4,000 if married filing
jointly), depending on your adjusted gross income . . . .”).
168 I.R.C. § 401(k) (2013); Retirement Topics – Exceptions to Tax on Early Distributions,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-
Employee/Retirement-Topics— -Tax-on-Early-Distributions (last updated Apr. 30, 2014)
(“Most retirement plan distributions are subject to income tax and may be subject to an
additional 10% tax.”); see also 401(k) Resource Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www
.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/401k-Resource-Guide-Plan-Partici
pants-General-Distribution-Rules (last visited Dec. 9, 2014) (stating that, if a withdrawal is
made before the worker hits age 591/2, the funds are subject to income taxes plus a 10
percent penalty tax on the amount withdrawn).
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age 591/2, the funds are subject to income taxes plus a ten-percent
penalty tax on the amount withdrawn.169  Therefore, as a practical
matter, funds invested in 401(k) plans are entrusted to the market for
decades, with the only choice for the worker being to move the funds
among permissible mutual fund investments offered by the 401(k)
plan.170
Americans are also investing in mutual funds to meet the other
major savings objective that families commonly face: funding their
children’s college education.  Tax incentives similar to a 401(k) plan
now exist in § 529 accounts that encourage Americans to put aside
money to pay for their children’s university and professional school
tuition and costs.171  As with 401(k) plans, investors are usually not
permitted to buy stocks or bonds directly but only to put their funds
into investment vehicles such as mutual funds controlled by others.172
For these reasons, the wealth of most Americans is increasingly be-
yond their direct access and control.
The reality that Americans have little choice but to give their
wealth over to institutional investors for investment in the stock mar-
ket creates a tension between the rulings in Citizens United and Abood.
In this context, there is no ability for an employee to exit unless she
wishes to quit her job and abandon her pension.173  But even if she
did, she would not escape the problem, because she would still need
to contribute to a 401(k) plan or a § 529 account.174  Given the over-
whelming prevalence of nonunion workplaces in the United States,175
169 401(k) Resource Guide, supra note 168. R
170 Id.
171 I.R.C. § 529 (2012); see also 529 Plans: Questions and Answers, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/529-Plans:-Questions-and-Answers (last visited Dec. 9, 2014)
(describing 529 plans as having “tax advantages and potentially other incentives to make it
easier to save for college and other post-secondary training”).
172 See An Introduction to 529 Plans, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
investor/pubs/intro529.htm (last updated Aug. 23, 2014) (“[P]articipants in college sav-
ings plans have limited investment options and are not permitted to switch freely among
available investment options.”).
173 See Brudney, supra note 131, at 270 n.126 (“[E]xit may be difficult for pension fund R
or other fund beneficiaries.”); Winkler, supra note 131, at 167 (footnote omitted)  (“Take,
for example, an employee whose money is invested in Corporation X through his pension
fund.  If Corporation X funds electoral speech with which the employee disagrees, the
employee is incapable of selling his shares and disassociating himself from the speech.  He
exercises virtually no control whatsoever over his pension plan; he may be able to withdraw
altogether from the plan, but there are often penalties for doing so.  How is the pensioned
employee who disagrees with the corporate speech to sell his shares? The simple answer is
that he cannot—at least not without substantial injury.” (emphasis omitted)).
174 See Sachs, supra note 131, at 825–26. R
175 Only 11.3% of the U.S. workforce is unionized. See Economic News Release: Union
Members Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.re
lease/union2.nr0.htm; Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-
Year Low, 11.3%, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/busi
ness/union-membership-drops-despite-job-growth.html (noting that the unionization rate
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it is arguably easier for Americans to find a job in a nonunion work-
place than to avoid entrusting their funds to institutional investors to
save for retirement and to pay for their children’s education.176
After Citizens United, these corporations can use treasury funds for
political expression that these investors have no role in authorizing.
The notion that Americans who save for such purposes are by that
necessity authorizing either their mutual fund or the corporations in
which those funds invest to “speak” to political matters on their behalf
is one that conservative corporate theory would find implausible.  And
the reasoning of Abood would suggest that governmental policies, such
as § 401(k) and § 529, that effectively coerce Americans into giving
others the right to use their funds to advance “ideological activities”
they do not endorse is itself constitutionally problematic.177  By hold-
ing that for-profit corporations have the First Amendment right to
spend their funds on political activity, Citizens United arguably exposes
American investors to the same constitutional harm found extant in
Abood, which is the same harm that conservative corporate theory
views as occurring when corporate managers spend funds for social
purposes.
Citizens United is also problematic for conservative corporate theo-
rists on pragmatic, but important, grounds.  In other words, the cur-
rent reality of the separation of ownership from ownership makes
even stronger the premise of conservative corporate theory that stock-
holders do not invest in for-profit corporations as an expression of
their desire to have corporate managers pursue idiosyncratic social
objectives.  So too does it strengthen the premise that the tools availa-
ble to those whose equity capital is ultimately at stake are not well
designed to constrain management from pursuing ends those inves-
tors may not support.
Respected scholars have noted that it is problematic for public
corporations to make political expenditures even if those expendi-
tures are supported by a majority of stockholders, because that would
associate the minority with political speech they might find inconsis-
tent with their own consciences.178  Scholars, both before and after
is at “its lowest level in close to a century”).  “More than 92% of private sector workers in
the United States are now nonunion.”  Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Struc-
tural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 695 (2010).
176 Sachs, supra note 131, at 839–40 (noting that it would be difficult to save for retire- R
ment and college education using investment income from Treasury bills instead of stocks
because this would “sacrifice a substantial percentage of . . . investment income”); Tucker,
supra note 159 (discussing the practical effects of the separation of ownership from owner- R
ship on both the ability of ordinary human investors to constrain political speech they do
not favor by corporations and their freedom to withdraw their capital from investments
because corporations are engaging in political speech they do not favor).
177 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977).
178 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 131, at 111–17. R
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Citizens United, have also recognized that investors in public corpora-
tions are in a position analogous to the nonunion worker in Abood.179
To address this concern post–Citizens United, some of them have ar-
gued that substantive corporate law should be altered to require that
any political expenditures be approved by a supermajority of stock-
holders or some other means to limit the potential that funds will be
used contrary to the minority’s will.180  This argument recognizes that
stockholders in for-profit corporations do not invest so their capital
might be deployed for political speech,181 and that Citizens United, if it
remains law, eliminates the ability to protect stockholders by a simple
ban on certain political expenditures from corporate treasuries.182
Notably, scholars also recognize that the pure option of “exit” is diffi-
cult for stockholders who must invest in the stock market to meet
their family needs long-term.183  This exacerbates the fact that most
end-user investors have to invest through intermediaries, which
strengthens the analogy to Abood.  If the concept of exit is the answer
to political spending stockholders do not favor, then it would require
that ordinary Americans refrain from investing in the mutual funds
most likely to provide the best risk-adjusted return: index funds.
Index funds only use exit when an issuer’s shares are removed from
the benchmark index for the fund.184
Because Citizens United unleashes corporations to act directly on
the election process and constitutionalizes the issue in a manner that
disables many legislative policy options—and because many investors
do not support the use of corporate funds for that purpose—Citizens
179 See id. at 113–14; see also Brudney, supra note 131, at 278–79 (“The corporate ana- R
logue to ‘collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment’ is the
conduct of corporate business, including the offering of goods or services for sale.”); Fisk
& Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1080–85 (“Surely that unions are compelled by law to run R
as democracies and to respect the free speech rights of minorities, while corporations are
not, is reason to suggest that employees should not have greater dissenters’ rights than
shareholders.”); Sachs, supra note 131, at 868 (“[E]specially in the post-Citizens United R
world, the state’s use of mandatory employee contributions to purchase corporate securi-
ties raises the type of compelled speech and association concerns implicated in Abood.”).
180 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 131, at 116–17. R
181 See id. at 115.
182 See id. at 114–17.
183 Greenwood, supra note 44, at 1025–29; see also Sachs, supra note 131, at 839 (“[A]n R
investor who objected to funding corporate political speech and who chose to avoid doing
so by pursuing an alternative investement strategy would, based on average returns since
1928, sacrifice a substantial percentage of her investment income.”); Elizabeth Pollman,
Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 53, 56–58 (2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/pdf/823_pa5w1bp2.pdf (“Even if
dissenting stockholders surmounted information and collective action problems and did
not face liquidity problems, they would still be left with few options for relief: sell the stock
or pursue a derivative action.”).
184 See John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-
Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1324 (2001) (“For index funds, exit is impossi-
ble, and for other large investors, quick liquidations can create substantial losses.”).
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United has stimulated a new cottage industry in suggesting corporate
and securities law changes that will enable stockholders to directly
constrain boards from engaging in political contributions.185  By creat-
ing a need to protect stockholders from having their entrusted capital
used for political purposes they did not authorize, Citizens United cre-
ates an incentive for corporate governance workarounds that divert
resources—including managerial time—from focusing on making the
corporation more profitable by developing more attractive products
and services.  These suggestions for addressing Citizens United through
substantive changes in corporate law collide with conservative corpo-
rate theory’s view of how for-profit corporations should be governed if
they are to best increase social welfare.186  Reasonable minds have a
basis to doubt that Milton Friedman would view stockholder exercises
in corporate democracy to talk about whether their corporations
should act on the political process in our republican democracy as
being worth the cost, particularly when the stockholders would involve
185 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Politi-
cal Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 949–53 (2013) (suggesting SEC disclosure rules on political
spending); John C. Coates IV & Taylor Lincoln, Fulfilling Kennedy’s Promise: Why the SEC
Should Mandate Disclosure of Corporate Political Activity 7–15 (July 2011)(unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923804 (arguing corporations should have
to disclose their spending); Joseph Kieran Leahy, Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions
Waste or Self-Dealing? A Closer Look, 79 MO. L. REV. 283 (2014) (examining the use of litiga-
tion to constrain corporate political spending and concluding it is not a promising tool);
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Transparent Elections After Citizens United, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
1, 7 (2011), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/transparent-elections-
after-citizens-united (arguing state disclosure laws regarding corporate political expendi-
tures should be adopted); Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Dis-
claimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 626
(2010) (“[L]egislators [should] consider a more sweeping regime of disclosure and dis-
claimer for corporate-funded speech.”); cf. Stephen A. Yoder, Legislative Intervention in Cor-
porate Governance Is Not a Necessary Response to Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 29 J.L. & COM. 1, 14 (2010) (discussing state and federal legislative responses
proposed by opponents of the decision).
Following Citizens United, there was a “significant uptick” in stockholder proposals
aimed at curbing political contributions and lobbying by companies.  See EQUILAR, 2013
VOTING ANALYTICS REPORT 25 (2013), available at http://www.equilar.com/images/pdf/
publications/2013/equilar-2013-voting-analytics-exec-summary.pdf; James R. Copeland,
Shareholder Activism Focused on Political Spending and Lobbying, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 10, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2012/06/10/shareholder-activism-focused-on-political-spending-and-lobbying.
During the 2013 proxy season, stockholders submitted eighty proposals related to political
contributions by corporations.  See EQUILAR, supra.  These ranged from a proposal at
Starbucks prohibiting the use of corporate funds for any political election to proposals at
Merck and eBay requiring the disclosure of corporate political spending.  Starbucks Corp.,
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 57–58 (Jan. 25, 2013); eBay, Inc., Proxy Statement
(Schedule 14A), at 24 (Mar. 18, 2013); Merck & Co., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A), at 67–68 (Apr. 15, 2013).
186 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 34–38. R
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index funds, emerging growth funds, pension funds, hedge funds,
and other nonhuman persons.187
V
CITIZENS UNITED WEAKENS CONSERVATIVE CORPORATE
THEORY’S ANSWER TO THE VULNERABILITY OF OTHER CORPORATE
CONSTITUENCIES TO EXTERNALITY RISK
Conservative corporate theory has had to confront the conten-
tion that if corporate managers focus solely on stockholder welfare as
the end of corporate governance, there will be unfair risks and costs
imposed on other corporate constituencies and interests affected by
the corporation’s conduct.188  Conservative corporate theory has two
answers.
187 We do not deal with every tension that Citizens United arguably creates with con-
servative thought, but two additional ones exist.  First, the logic of Citizens United would
seem to extend protection to foreign corporations, creating the potential for wealthy non-
American entities to influence the outcome of our elections.  Although corporations are
chartered by a particular jurisdiction, it is increasingly difficult to identify the largest, mul-
tinational corporations with any national identity.  These corporations not only often have
large subsidiaries that operate abroad, but, as important, their stockholder bases are be-
coming more and more international. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., DEP’T OF TREA-
SURY, FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES 3 (2012), available at http://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/shla2012r.pdf (foreign
holdings of U.S. equities doubled in value between 2005 and 2012); FED. RESERVE BANK OF
N.Y., DEP’T OF TREASURY, U.S. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF FOREIGN SECURITIES 3 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/shc
2011r.pdf (U.S. holdings of foreign equities increased in value by 48% between 2005 and
2011).  Given that members of the Citizens United majority find it problematic for decisions
of foreign courts to be considered as persuasive precedent when deciding cases before the
Supreme Court, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622–29 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
there is tension in ignoring the reality that corporations are not citizens of any nation in
the same way as humans are, but could have an important influence on who gets elected to
the political offices of our nation and states.
Second, state, county, and municipal pension funds control the voting rights of a large
amount of stock in American public corporations. See Murphy, supra note 156, at 503–04 R
(“Pension funds now hold approximately 24 percent of the total U.S. equity market and 29
percent of the equity in the 1000 largest corporations.  Roughly 40 percent of these equity
investments are found in public pension funds for state, local and federal employees . . . .”
(footnote omitted)); Jeffrey R. Brown, Joshua Pollet & Scott J. Weisbenner, The Investment
Behavior of State Pension Plans 1 (NBER Working Paper, Sept. 2009), available at http://www
.nber.org/aging/rrc/papers/orrc09-12.pdf (“[S]tate and local pension fund assets
amounted to over $2.3 trillion in 2006 . . . [and as] of the year 2002, these public pension
plans accounted for approximately 1/6 of the ownership of the U.S. stock market.”).
Under Citizens United, these government-affiliated funds, which often have elected officials
on their boards, could play a role in influencing how corporations spend money to influ-
ence who gets elected to political office.  Conservative icons such as Hayek, Levitt, and
Friedman might have found this prospect disquieting.
188 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 35, at 291 (arguing that directors should be “al- R
lowed free rein to consider and make trade-offs between the conflicting interests of differ-
ent corporate constituencies”); Mitchell, supra note 36, at 606 (suggesting that directors R
may “favor stockholders at the expense of the conflicting constituents’ interests”).
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The first is theoretical and depends on the proposition that stock-
holders can only benefit if the corporation first honors all of its obliga-
tions to legal claimants, such as creditors and employees owed wages,
and to follow the law.  Because equity holders can only get paid if
there is surplus in excess of what is available to pay the corporation’s
legal debts, running corporations for the end of stockholder profit
maximization must benefit all corporate constituents because growing
the pie for stockholders will best ensure that other constituencies get
their legally-owed share.189  Of course, this is an idealized theory that
depends in a large way on ignoring the reality that stockholders can
receive payouts at various times, in advance of the corporation paying
off all its long-term debts, and that stockholder bases turn over fre-
quently.190  Because stockholders are not required to remain stuck in
and hold all the risks until some actual summing up, calling them
“residual claimants” can be highly misleading unless done in a
nuanced way for discrete and measured purposes.
The more convincing and predominant answer that conservative
corporate theory has to externality risk is to acknowledge that the risk
is real and that it is to be addressed, not by corporations themselves
through voluntary decisions, but by compulsory societal regulation.191
Conservative corporate theory therefore accepts the fundamental eco-
nomic reality that rational economic actors have an incentive to keep
as much of the profits of their activity for themselves as they can while
seeking to shift the costs of their economic activity to others if possi-
ble.192  The “tragedy of the commons”193 is the academic label often
used to illustrate this phenomenon, and the real world tragedy of per-
189 E.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 38. R
190 Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1274 (1999)
(“[O]ne can easily imagine situations in which nonshareholder constituencies will be con-
cerned as much as, if not more than, shareholders about the outcomes associated with a
particular corporate decision.”).
191 See Arrow, supra note 18, at 135–37, 142; BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION, supra note 24, R
at 425 (pointing out that negative externalities created by corporate conduct should be
“constrained through general welfare legislation, tort litigation, and other forms of regula-
tion”); Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 17, at 4 (arguing that “political mecha- R
nisms, not market mechanisms, are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of
scarce resources to alternative uses”); Romano, supra note 119, at 944, 961 & n.107 (associ- R
ating conservative corporate law theorists with pluralist political philosophy, and noting
that “[p]luralism supports regulating corporations when there are externalities, in order to
affect the profit maximization calculus”); see also Engel, supra note 70, at 4–5 (arguing that R
social welfare is best served by having for-profit corporations focus on profit maximization
and leaving it to government to address externality risk to society and other corporate
constituencies).
192 See Arrow, supra note 18, at 131. R
193 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 47 12-JAN-15 14:48
2015] CONSERVATIVE COLLISION COURSE? 381
vasive environmental wreckage caused by capitalist behavior in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries is evidence of this reality.194
Conservative corporate theory does not deny this or similar risks.
But its answer is that the most responsible, legitimate, and effective
solution is not to permit corporate managers to govern toward the
end of a better environment, safer products, or a stable financial sec-
tor for the good of society as a whole.  Rather, it is to have the legiti-
mate instruments of the people’s will, reflective of their desire, set the
boundaries for corporate conduct by regulating externality risk in the
public interest.195  Conservative corporate theory developed this con-
cept based on the understanding that the corporation’s ability to act
194 See, e.g., John Broder, U.S. Acts to Fine BP and Top Contractors for Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at A18 (describing how the unmonitored offshore drilling activities of
British Petroleum and its contractors resulted in a major oil spill).  Other examples of
externality risks include: (1) use of contractors who run sweatshops to make products for
large multinationals, see, e.g., Robert Kuttner, Sweat and Tears, AM. PROSPECT 61, 61
(July–Aug. 2013) (noting that the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory complex in Ban-
gladesh, which made apparel for Western multinational companies, is one of the deadliest
disasters in the history of the global garment industry); M.B., Battle of the Brands,
SCHUMPETER: BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT, ECONOMIST (May 16, 2013, 8:31 AM), http://
www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/05/factory-safety (pointing out that the
multinational apparel companies that made clothes in Rana Plaza were negligent in moni-
toring the safety of the factory); and (2) the wreckage of the international financial system,
see, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 716–24 (2010) (observing that leading financial firms’ pursuit of
high-risk, high-return strategies contributed to the outbreak of the 2008 international fi-
nancial crisis); John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 55 (2014) (“It is tolerably clear that the difficulties banks found them-
selves in by the fall of 2008 were the consequence of the pursuit of high-risk, high-return
strategies by bank executives.  Such strategies earn good returns for shareholders, but by
raising the volatility of the firm’s cashflows, also increase the risk of its failure . . . .”).
195 E.g., Engel, supra note 70, at 34–35 (“[P]ursuit of maximum profits would be the R
corporation’s well-directed contribution to society’s search for Pareto-optimality—one
social goal whose pursuit by corporations presumably has consensus support if anything
does. . . .  Insofar as the profit-maximization proxy fails at any time to direct corporate
energies down routes supported by social consensus, the legislature has the power, at least
in theory, to modify the profit consequences of any given corporate action, so as to nudge
corporate behavior in the direction society prefers. . . .  Whatever the source of the per-
ceived shortcomings in the profit-maximization proxy, the legislature can enact liability
rules, regulatory provisions backed by criminal sanctions, or other measures, to correct the
shortcomings.” (footnotes omitted)).
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on the political process was subject, as it historically had been, to the
legislative process, the very process that gave corporations life.196
196 Among the forms of regulation that emerged early in the period when corpora-
tions formed under general corporation laws and began to get larger in size was regulation
of corporate involvement in the political process. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Imper-
sonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 616 nn.199–200 (1990) (citing
the enactment of federal and state regulation of corporate political activity in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 49–53 (2014) (discussing how, when confronted
with the increasing pursuit by corporations of favorable regulatory policies in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, such as tolerance of child labor and immunity from taxa-
tion, the response by progressives like Theodore Roosevelt and even conservatives like
Elihu Root was to “sever ties between corporations and politics, [by] enacting statutes that
were the direct ancestors of the legislation found unconstitutional a century later in Citi-
zens United”).  The iconic statement of the early understanding of the corporation’s
subordinate role to the society that gave it life was issued by Chief Justice John Marshall in
1819. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.  These
are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.”).
That statement continued to resonate for over a century and is cited to this day.
In 1916, brewers challenged the constitutionality of the Tillman Act on First Amend-
ment grounds.  In rejecting that challenge to the first federal act to restrict the influence of
corporate money in elections, the district court judge echoed the sentiments in Chief
Justice Marshall’s Dartmouth decision.  United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. 163, 168
(W.D. Pa. 1916) (“In the exercise of its prerogatives and to secure greater economy and
efficiency, the government has thought best that certain artificial bodies should be created
with certain fixed and definite powers; and acting within certain prescribed limitations.
These artificial creatures are not citizens of the United States, and, so far as the franchise is
concerned, must at all times be held subservient and subordinate to the government and
the citizenship of which it is composed.”).  Much of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence was not articulated until the 1920s and after. See JON B. GOULD, SPEAK NO
EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION 45 (2005) (“First Amendment jurispru-
dence is still a relatively new doctrine, having emerged from the courts’ cocoon in the early
1900s.”); Eugene Gressman, Bicentennializing Freedom of Expression, 20 SETON HALL L. REV.
378, 380 (1990) (“Not until after the end of World War I did the nation or the Court begin
to give serious heed to what was written [in the First Amendment] in 1789.”); Post, supra, at
71–78 (noting that judicial protection for First Amendment rights developed in the years
after World War I); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1303 (1983) (same).
And, as the Supreme Court itself noted in McConnell v. FEC, the Court had upheld
statutory restrictions on for-profit corporations’ ability to engage in certain political activ-
ity. See 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003); Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corpo-
rations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 118 (2014) (“The very provisions challenged in Citizens United
had been upheld in the 2003 McConnell v. FEC decision, which noted how the Court had
repeatedly upheld such restrictions on corporate spending. Citizens United marked a sharp
break from those earlier decisions.” (footnote omitted)).  Chief Justice Marshall’s reason-
ing in Dartmouth was cited in 1977 by conservative Justice William Rehnquist in support of
his dissent in Bellotti, arguing that there was no constitutional right for corporations to
engage in political speech:
There can be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation with
the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly guar-
antees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due
process of law.  Likewise, when a State charters a corporation for the
purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily assumes that the corpora-
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Citizens United undermines conservative corporate theory’s reli-
ance upon the regulatory process as a safeguard against externality.
Because Citizens United permits the corporation to act directly to influ-
ence who is elected to office by using the huge resources in corporate
treasuries, it is likely as a general matter to make candidates of all
persuasions more beholden to corporate desires.  Under conservative
corporate theory, the only legitimate reason for a for-profit corpora-
tion to make political expenditures will be to elect or defeat
candidates based on their support for policies that the corporation
believes will produce the most profits.197  Almost by definition, this
will increase the danger of externality risk, because corporate expend-
itures will be made with the singular objective of stockholder profit in
mind, and therefore will be likely to favor policies that leave the cor-
poration with the profits from their operations, while shifting the
costs of those operations (including of excessive risk taking or safety
shortcuts) to others.
tion is entitled to the liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its
business. . . .  Until recently, it was not thought that any persons, natural or
artificial, had any protected right to engage in commercial speech.  Al-
though the Court has never explicitly recognized a corporation’s right of
commercial speech, such a right might be considered necessarily incidental
to the business of a commercial corporation.
It cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression
is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized
for commercial purposes.  A State grants to a business corporation the
blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its
efficiency as an economic entity.  It might reasonably be concluded that
those properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dan-
gers in the political sphere.  Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties
of political expression are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for
which States permit commercial corporations to exist.  So long as the
Judicial Branches of the State and Federal Governments remain open to
protect the corporation’s interest in its property, it has no need, though it
may have the desire, to petition the political branches for similar protec-
tion.  Indeed, the States might reasonably fear that the corporation would
use its economic power to obtain further benefits beyond those already be-
stowed.  I would think that any particular form of organization upon which
the State confers special privileges or immunities different from those of
natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether the organiza-
tion is a labor union, a partnership, a trade association, or a corporation.
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824–27 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (foot-
notes omitted) (citation omitted).
Even as recently as 1986, Justice Rehnquist would write:
Extension of the individual’s freedom of conscience decisions to business
corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the breaking point.
To ascribe to such artificial entities an “intellect” or “mind” for freedom of
conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
197 See Allen, supra note 25, at 265 (noting that, under conservative corporate theory, R
directors must seek to advance the financial interests of the stockholder-owners).
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Precisely because the for-profit corporation has been so success-
ful as a means to generate wealth, the means at its disposal will be
huge.  Even before McCain-Feingold was struck down by Citizens
United, corporate political spending far exceeded that of labor or
other interest groups.198  After Citizens United, that imbalance grew.199
Under conservative corporate theory, corporations are funda-
mentally different from human beings in terms of their range of con-
cern.  Corporations cannot give equal weight to a concern for the
environment, for the moral obligations owed to others, or for the best
interests of workers or consumers.  Corporations, under conservative
corporate theory, cannot even give equal weight to patriotism, in
terms of loyalty to the nation on whose public stock markets the cor-
poration’s shares trade and under the laws of a particular state it is
chartered.  Unlike human beings, corporations must have only one
end that motivates their political spending: what will produce the
most profit for them in the purely monetary sense.200
For that reason, if conservative corporate theory holds, the only
reason why a corporation would choose to make a corporate political
expenditure would be to support a candidate that would help the cor-
poration make money for the benefit of its stockholders.  Thus, corpo-
rations will only make expenditures in favor of candidates who will
help the corporation make money.  These candidates will be candi-
dates who favor the corporations’ regulatory agenda, i.e., candidates
who favor rules whereby the corporation is more likely to externalize
the negative costs of its activities on to society.201  For example, the
198 See Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates and Par-
ties, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/blio.php?cycle
=2008 [hereinafter Split 2008] (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).  Business PACs gave over $300
million to candidates in the 2007–2008 business cycle, compared to just under $75 million
by unions.  Public corporations also provided indirect funding to political causes through
intermediaries, like the Chamber of Commerce. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 131, at R
93–94 & tbl.1.  These intermediaries “do not have to disclose either the identity of the
corporations that make these contributions or the amounts they contribute” but are able
to spend “considerable sums” on lobbying and politics. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note
185, at 930–32 & tbl.1 (estimating that eight active intermediaries spent more than $1.5 R
billion on politics in the six-year period between 2005 and 2010).
199 In 2012—the first presidential election year after Citizens United—business PACs
gave approximately $365 million to candidates, parties, and super PACs, whereas labor
unions gave approximately $65 million. Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual
Donations to Candidates, Parties, Super PACs and Outside Spending Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/blio.php?cycle=2012 [hereinafter Split
2012] (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
200 See Tucker, supra note 159, at 527 (“[W]hen corporations speak, it is speech of an R
economic—not a political—nature, due to corporations’ singular fidelity to profit
maximization.”).
201 David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsi-
bility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (2011) (“Because regulation threat-
ens to diminish profits, and because directors are given the fiduciary obligation to pursue
profits, combating the development and implementation of regulation becomes an impor-
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corporation’s preferred candidate may be hostile to a Pigouvian tax
whereby the corporation must pay for the social costs of its activi-
ties.202  Likewise, corporations will have an inclination to relax laws
that are designed to protect the corporation’s employees or consum-
ers.203  Under the conservative theory that a corporation must spend
its wealth to maximize stockholders’ own wealth, this is the logical re-
sult of the corporation’s ability to spend money in the political
process.
But, as pointed out, the actual ultimate providers of equity capital
are human and are not only indirect stockholders (and often credi-
tors through investments in bond funds) of for-profit corporations,
but often more importantly direct employees of and consumers of the
products of such corporations.204  They also breathe the air, drink the
water, and live on the land affected by the corporation’s operations.
As taxpayers, they may be called upon to subsidize corporations that
have failed and cannot meet their obligations to pensioners or others,
or that are deemed too big to fail.  As human beings with diverse
moral beliefs and concerns, American investors speak about and vote
on political matters for many reasons other than personal profit.
Even as diversified investors, it is not clear that ordinary Americans
tant aspect of the firm’s work.”); Armour & Gordon, supra note 194, at 38 (“[The corporate R
governance mechanisms that encourage shareholder value maximization] create incen-
tives for firms systematically to undermine the efficacy of regulatory internalization.
Rather than innovation that reduces the social costs of one’s activities in accordance with
regulatory strictures, the cheapest way to maximize shareholder returns may be to exercise
political influence to achieve a lower rate of regulatory ‘tax.’  The upshot is that whatever
the extent of the work that may be done by regulation, [shareholder value maximization]
will tend systematically to undermine it.”).
202 See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192–93 (1920); see also
Armour & Gordon, supra note 194, at 47 (“In the presence of appropriately-priced R
Pigouvian taxes, then the firm has incentives either to reduce the level of the activity in
question, or to take precautions against harm up to the extent to which they are socially
cost-justified. . . .  Because social costs have been factored into the firm’s bottom line, then
the share price will reflect residual returns after social costs are taken into account.  [Share-
holder value maximization] therefore focuses managers’ attention on ways of reducing the
social cost of the activities in question.  More precisely, [shareholder value maximization]
focuses managers’ attention on ways of reducing the regulatory burden that the firm incurs
on its activities, much like the firm would seek to minimize any other tax.” (footnote
omitted)).
203 In a review of how corporations have attempted to use the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment to advance their interests, Professor Mayer links the rise of exter-
nality regulation of the increasingly powerful corporations that arose after the move to
general corporation laws to corporate interest in using the Constitution to restrict regula-
tion of their activities.  As Mayer notes, when corporations were specifically chartered by
government, their activities were directly restricted in their charters, minimizing the need
for more general prudential regulation.  After specific chartering gave way to more ena-
bling general corporation statutes, substantive legislation regulating externality risks cre-
ated by corporate activity became more common, and corporations used constitutional
litigation to attempt to invalidate or limit regulation. See Mayer, supra note 196, at 579–93. R
204 See supra text accompanying note 60. R
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are advantaged if corporate managers can influence the political pro-
cess to reduce externality regulations, because such externalities can
affect the overall growth of the economy and investor returns.205
Citizens United, however, ignores the reality that nonhuman cor-
porations are fundamentally distinct from their ultimate human inves-
tors, in strong contradiction to the hard-headed realism of
conservative corporate theory.  It also ignores the reality that these
human investors cannot, for the reasons indicated, truly use the
wealth they have entrusted to the stock market to counterbalance cor-
porate speech.  That personal wealth is impounded in their 401(k)
plans, which are invested in those corporations.
Because the corporate form has worked as intended, corporate
wealth dwarfs that of even the richest Americans.  The ten richest peo-
ple in the United States have a net worth of about $370 billion.206
The ten wealthiest corporations have equity of $1.6 trillion, over four
times as much.207  Flesh-and-blood humans do not have the wallet to
compete with corporations.  Furthermore, corporate financial fire-
205 Scholars recognize that if the externality costs generated to create corporate profits
are too high, even the stockholders of those corporations may be worse off, because if they
are diversified, the externality costs from the harm to society may exceed any gain to them
as firm-specific stockholders.  As John Armour and Jeff Gordon write:
[T]he shareholder value norm creates incentives for firms systematically to
undermine the efficacy of regulatory internalization.
[And], where the harms are systemic, even the firm’s diversified share-
holders, its majoritarian owners, would rather that the managers did not
impose externalities.  Risks of systemic harms—that is, affecting the econ-
omy at large—increase the undiversifiable portion of investors’ risk.  In re-
lation to projects with such potential consequences, diversified investors
should not want managers to single-mindedly maximize share prices.  As a
result, a system in which ‘shareholder value’ is interpreted as share price
maximization is paradoxically not aligning managers’ interests with those of
dispersed shareholders, at least as regards systemic risks.
Armour & Gordon, supra note 194, at 76 (emphasis omitted).  The separation of owner- R
ship from ownership exacerbates this concern:
[D]iversified shareholders typically hold their shares through institutional
investor intermediaries, whose governance activism will be constrained by
what one of us has termed the ‘agency costs of agency capitalism.’  This
refers to self-interested behavior by intermediaries who are typically evalu-
ated by relative, rather than absolute, performance.  Such intermediaries
ordinarily have little incentive to intervene in the governance of portfolio
firms, because to do so would incur private costs yet confer a benefit on
their investment management competitors who also hold the same stock—
a classic free-rider problem.
Id. at 60 (citation omitted).
206 The World’s Billionaires, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list (last visited
Dec. 9, 2014) (2014 list).
207 Fortune 500 2013, CNN MONEY, http://fortune.com/fortune500/2013/ (last visited
Nov. 14, 2014).
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power dwarfs that of labor unions, because among other reasons, if
labor were as rich as capital, it would be capital and not labor.208
After Citizens United, corporate and labor donations to PACs
increased.209  Although there are no precise data on contributions to
political campaigns, the Center for Responsive Politics found that in
the 2008 election cycle, i.e., the last general election before Citizens
United, donations from business interests to political candidates to-
taled $2 billion, while donations from trade unions were only $75 mil-
lion.210  In the 2012 election cycle—that is, after Citizens United—the
donations of corporate interests increased to $2.7 billion, while union
donations were up to $140 million.211
VI
MCCAIN-FEINGOLD’S DESIGN WAS CONSISTENT WITH
CONSERVATIVE CORPORATE THEORY AND LEFT FOR-PROFIT
CORPORATIONS WITH SUBSTANTIAL EXPRESSIVE CLOUT
As we have shown, Citizens United embraces an understanding of
corporate governance that is in tension with conservative corporate
theory.  Statutory and constitutional law before McCain-Feingold put
far less pressure on conservative corporate theory’s foundations.212
Before Citizens United, corporations were free to lobby elected officials
for regulatory policies they thought desirable.213  By all measures,
there appears to be no plausible argument that corporations were out-
gunned in this domain, as corporate lobbying expenditures greatly
exceeded that of other interests.214
208 Between 2000 and 2008, business interests outspent labor interests by a four-to-one
margin. See Tilman Klumpp, Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, THE BUSINESS OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections 9 (July 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ualberta.ca/~klumpp/docs/cu.pdf.
Labor unions also face more onerous disclosure requirements. See Bebchuk & Jackson,
supra note 185, at 960–61. R
209 See Coates, Corporate Politics, supra note 115, at 658 (“Although Citizens United R
changed the law only for ‘independent expenditures,’ registered lobbying and PAC activity
by corporations jumped in 2010, in both frequency and amount, particularly at firms that
were already politically active in 2008 . . . .”).
210 See Split 2008, supra note 198.
211 See Split 2012, supra note 199.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 11–13 (“McCain-Feingold fit nicely with con-
servative corporate law theory regarding for-profit firms.”).
213 See supra text accompanying note 10.
214 See HEIDI WELSH & ROBIN YOUNG, SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS INST., CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE OF POLITICAL EXPENDITURES: 2011 BENCHMARK REPORT ON S&P 500 COMPANIES 2,
47 (2011), available at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Political_Spending_Report_Nov_
10_2011.pdf (“S&P 500 companies allocated $979.3 million (87 percent) of the $1.1 billion
they gave in 2010 to [federal] lobbying.  They spent a further $112 million (10 percent) on
state level candidates, parties and ballot initiatives and $31 million (3 percent) on federally
registered political committees.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 54 12-JAN-15 14:48
388 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:335
Similarly, corporations could act as aggregators for those of their
stockholders and employees who voluntarily chose to contribute to
corporate-sponsored PACs, which could then engage in independent
expenditures and, within the limits of campaign laws, even direct con-
tributions to candidates.215  By this means, the law addressed conserva-
tive corporate theory’s concern that corporate managers had no
legitimacy to spend corporate funds for purposes other than profit
maximization because that is not why stockholders invest and because
stockholders have diverse political views.  By enabling corporations to
seek voluntary contributions from stockholders and employees,
McCain-Feingold and prior law facilitated corporate speech from
those corporate constituencies who desired that end.  Again, the re-
sulting reality was not that corporations were outgunned.  Corporate
PACs were potent sources of political spending.216
The one limit that pre–Citizens United law did impose was on the
ability to use corporate funds directly to influence the election pro-
cess, particularly in terms of using corporate funds to expressly advo-
cate the election or defeat of candidates.217  This limit was consistent
with premises of conservative corporate theory because it buttressed
the notion that externality risk could be effectively addressed by the
political process.  By giving candidates some buffer against having
massive corporate treasury funds unleashed against them directly if
they did not support regulatory policies corporations advocate, this
limit supported conservative corporate theory’s argument that society
and other corporate constituencies are protected because corpora-
tions have to play by the rules of the game, and those rules are not set
by the corporations themselves, but by government officials elected by
human beings, not corporations.
215 See 11 C.F.R. § 110.2 (2009) (regarding $5,000 per-candidate limit on PAC contri-
butions); id. § 114.5 (regarding separate segregated funds).
216 On a similar practical level, pre–Citizens United statutory and decisional law re-
flected an ability on the part of legislators and of the Supreme Court to ensure that restric-
tions on corporate activity designed to address for-profit corporations did not chill the
ability of individuals to come together using a corporate vehicle specifically for genuinely
expressive purposes. See FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (holding
that § 203(b) of the McCain-Feingold Act, which prohibits a corporation from broadcast-
ing shortly before an election a communication naming a candidate and targeted to the
electorate, was unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit, nonstock corporation organized
for advocacy purposes); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986)
(holding that § 441b of the Federal Election Campaign Act, which prohibited corporations
from making expenditures out of their treasuries “in connection with” a federal election,
was unconstitutional as applied to a non–business corporation organized for advocacy pur-
poses, which had no stockholders, and did not accept contributions from business corpora-
tions or labor unions).
217 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006) (banning corporate and union treasury expendi-
tures “for any . . .  electioneering communication”); Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 249
(construing § 441b to cover only “express advocacy”).
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VII
CITIZENS UNITED STRENGTHENS THE ARGUMENT THAT
CONSERVATIVE CORPORATE THEORY IS SOCIALLY
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND LEGALLY ERRONEOUS
After Citizens United, the rival to conservative corporate theory has
been arguably strengthened.  The logical result of Citizens United,
when combined with the conservative corporate theory view that cor-
porations should only spend money on increasing stockholders’
wealth, is that corporations will pour money into the electoral process
to increase the returns to their stockholders.  Because corporate
wealth far exceeds that held directly by human beings, if corporations
are able to act directly to influence who is elected to office, the laws
and regulations in our society will increasingly tend to tolerate the
imposition of greater externalities, because they will be enacted by
politicians who have been elected in an expensive process in which
money matters, and in which securing the support of nonhuman cor-
porate money with a monocular focus on profit will be important to
electoral competitiveness.
Anyone who has ever seriously discussed Citizens United with a
range of fellow Americans has doubtless heard the argument that the
reelection of President Obama refutes the notion that Citizens United
has any important policy effect.218  Aside from the fact that Citizens
United was only decided in 2010 and that it already had a documented
effect on campaign behavior in 2012, the mere election of a Demo-
cratic President does not mean that Citizens United had no effect on
actual human citizens.219  Rather, the question is whether Citizens
United will make candidates of both parties who wish to be competitive
far more dependent on corporate funds and therefore constrict the
range of policy options available to address corporate externalities.  A
recent empirical study concludes that Citizens United had the effect in
2012 of increasing the probabilities that Republican candidates for
state legislative races would get elected, but predicts that over time the
bigger effect Citizens United will have is to shift power within the politi-
cal marketplace to for-profit corporations and therefore to make both
political parties more likely to embrace their policy preferences.220
Another study has found that corporate political activity since Citizens
218 See, e.g., Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, Spending by Independent Groups Had Little Impact
on Election, Analysis Finds, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/decision2012/spending-by-independent-groups-had-little-election-impact-analysis-
finds/2012/11/07/15fd30ea-276c-11e2-b2a0-ae18d6159439_story.html.
219 See supra note 199.
220 Klumpp, Mialon & Williams, supra note 208, at 25–26 (indicating why Citizens R
United is likely to increase the already large spending margin corporations enjoyed before
the decision issued).
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United has increased generally.221  This suggests that, post–Citizens
United, companies in regulated industries will be more able to “cap-
ture” regulators so as to bend the rules of the game in their own favor.
As a result, the rival argument that corporations should have to
consider the best interests of all corporate constituencies and societies
as a whole when making decisions is strengthened.222  Otherwise, one
form of nonhuman citizen that as a matter of reality controls much of
the wealth of actual humans will have the ability to imbalance public
policy, in a manner that is inconsistent with social welfare.  Put plainly,
if corporations are regarded as having equal rights with human be-
ings, without regard to the real-world differences between for-profit
corporations and human beings recognized by and built into the de-
sign of conservative corporate theory, their managers must have the
legal right to act with conscience and a regard for the full range of
concerns that animate flesh-and-blood citizens of the United States.  If
the for-profit corporation really is a citizen like any other, and a dis-
tinct one from that of any of its constituencies, including its stockhold-
ers, then its board must be entitled to have it act as a patriotic, moral
citizen imbued with a conscience.  If the notion of a corporation—a
nexus of contracts—acting with a conscience is strange to conservative
corporate theorists, their intellectual rivals would argue that Citizens
United has made that strange notion a necessity because their con-
servative colleagues on the Supreme Court have equated the for-profit
corporation with flesh-and-blood Americans entitled to cast a vote.
221 Coates, Corporate Politics, supra note 115, at 685–86, 688.  Coates doubts whether R
corporate political spending is good for stockholders solely as stockholders of particular
firms, because his results indicate that increased political spending was negatively corre-
lated with firm profitability in all sectors except one: industries that are heavily subject to
government regulation. See id. at 682, 688. This finding suggests that these firms’ political
spending was intended to tilt the regulatory playing field in their direction, and thus tends
to confirm the problem this Article identifies for conservative corporate theory.
222 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
2003, 2005 n.6 (2013) (citing Citizens United as recognition that “corporations are indepen-
dent legal entities that own themselves” in support of her argument that stockholder
wealth maximization is bad law and policy); Susanna Kim Ripken, Citizens United, Corpo-
rate Personhood, and Corporate Power: The Tension Between Constitutional Law and Corporate Law,
6 UNIV. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 313–15 (2012) (arguing that Citizens United is
not the cause of excess corporate power and influence in society, but a symptom, and that
addressing concerns about corporate influence will require changes within corporate law
itself); Yosifon, supra note 201, at 1237 (“Multi-stakeholder governance will help to solve R
the public choice problem inherent in the shareholder primacy system, a problem that will
only be exacerbated after Citizens United. . . .  My argument is that shareholder primacy is
not viable unless one is prepared to allow government to restrict corporate political
activity . . . .”); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181,
228–30 (2014) (“As long as Citizens United is good constitutional law, shareholder primacy
is bad corporate theory. . . .  Instead, we must have fundamental reform of corporate gov-
ernance law that requires directors to actively attend to the interests of multiple stakehold-
ers at the level of firm governance, openly, honestly, and in good faith.”).
